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SOCIAL AND POLITICAL ASPECTS OF CIVIL 
PROCEDURE-REFORMS AND TRENDS IN 
WESTERN AND EASTERN EUROPE 
Mauro Cappelletti* 
Is there any contribution that a European student of comparative law and procedure can make to the study of procedural reforms 
in the United States? 
Clearly, the answer to this question cannot come from me. You 
will have to judge for yourself whether or not the continental prob-
lems of which ,I shall speak in this lecture are similar enough to the 
problems in your country to deserve your attention; whether or not 
the European solutions, as well as the trends, needs, and designs of 
reform, may offer any suggestions to Americans. 
It is my intention first to analyze the reforms accomplished in 
Europe in the relatively recent past. I shall then turn to the principal 
current problems and trends of reform. Finally, I will reflect on the 
intellectual and socio-political background of such reforms, prob-
lems, and trends. This approach will also give us the opportunity to 
discuss what kind of scholarship in the field of civil procedure is 
demanded today, at least in Europe but probably elsewhere as well, 
in order to meet the changed needs of our time. 
I. A LOOK AT THE PAST 
The most varied systems of civil procedure have been in force at 
one time or another in continental Europe.1 I shall not go back to 
the ancient ones. I am concerned here only with those types that still 
exercise some influence-for better or for worse--on the Continent. 
We must begin with the late Middle Ages and the jus commune 
procedure, the "common" procedure of Europe, adopted by the 
ecclesiastical and imperial courts; defined and refined by the learned 
doctores at the School of Bologna and all of the other Schools in Italy 
and elsewhere which followed the Bolognese model; influencing, and 
yet in turn influenced by, the statutory developments of the free 
city-states, the principalities, and other sovereignties; "received" as 
• Professor of Law, University of Florence (Italy) and Stanford University; Direc-
tor of the Institute of Comparative Law, University of Florence; Visiting Professor, 
Boalt Hall, University of California, Berkeley, 1970-1971; D. jur. 1952 University of 
Florence.-Ed. 
1. See A. ENGELMANN et al., A HISTORY OF CONTINENTAL CML PROCEDURE (R. 
Millar ed. Boston: Little, Brown, 1927) [hereinafter ENGELMANN]; M. CAPPELLE'IT.I &: 
J. PERILLO, CIVIL PROCEDURE IN ITALY 25-46 (The Hague: Nijhoff. 1965). 
[847] 
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the regular, general type of procedure by most of the Continent dur-
ing the last centuries of the Middle Ages, and still the prevailing 
procedural norm on the eve of the French Revolution and beyond.2 
Subject to many variations-particularly noteworthy were those 
in France3-the jus commune procedure had certain unique charac-
teristics. First, it attributed absolute predominance, indeed a real 
monopoly, to the written element. "Quod non est in actis non est in 
mundo": procedural acts not reduced to writing were null and void; 
and a judgment based on elements other than written ones was itself 
null and void.4 
Second, it discouraged any personal, direct, open contact between 
the adjudicating body and the parties, the witnesses, the experts, or 
other sources of information such as places and things. The judge 
was required to base his decision exclusively upon the written record, 
not his personal impressions. Why not, then, entrust the preparation 
of the record to persons other than the judge? Thus, the actuarii, 
the notarii, and others-not the judge-examined the witnesses in 
camera and translated into written language--often Latin-the wit-
nesses' spoken words. The court only met with the papers-at the 
end of the proceeding. 5 Hence, a wall existed between the judge, 
usually a doctor and as such a representative of a small ruling seg-
ment of society, and the other persons involved in a civil litigation, 
particularly the parties and witnesses. With that wall came the in-
sulation of the judge from the facts and, of course, from the people 
as well. 
Third, the jus commune civil procedure was characterized by the 
so-called "formal" or "legal" system of proof. The evaluation of 
evidence was mathematically established by law. One witness was 
no proof at all-testis unus testis nullus6-:with but one exception, 
2, See, e.g., Engelmann, The Romano-Canonical Procedure, in ENGELMANN, supra 
note I, at 417-504; Engelmann et al., Modern Continental Procedure, in ENGELMANN, 
at 507-86, 645-46, 783-84; Chiovenda, Roman and Germanic Elements in Continental 
Civil Procedure, in ENGELMANN, at 875-914. 
3. See I G. CHIOVENDA, !STITUZIONI DI DIRITTO PROCESSUALE CMLE 101-02, 130-32 
(Napoli: Jovene. 2d ed. 1935); Millar, The Formative Principles of Civil Procedure, in 
ENGELMANN, supra note 1, at 51. Cf. Engelmann et al., Modern Continental Procedure, 
in ENGELMANN at 645-782. 
4. The literature in this field is immense. See, e.g., M. CAFPELLETII, Procedure orale et 
procedure t!crite 42-43 (Milano: Giuffre. 1971); Engelmann, The Romano-Canonical 
Procedure, in ENGELMANN, supra note 1, at 457-58. 
5. See, e.g., 1 G. CHIOVENDA, supra note 3, at 127-28; Millar, supra note ll, at 64. 
6. See, e.g., 7 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE 242-43 (Boston: Little, Brown. lld ed. 1940); 
Millar, supra note 3, at 44. The rule was still uncritically asserted by Pothier on the 
eve of the French Revolution. Traitt! des obligations, in 1 OEUVRES de R.-J. POTHIER 
§ 818, at 246 (Bruxelles: Jonker, Ode, et Woden. 1829). See the criticism of Pothier by 
E. BONNIER, TRAITE THEORIQUE ET PRATIQUE DES PREUVES EN DROIT CIVIL ET EN DROIT 
CRIMlNEL § 293, at 264 (Paris: Plon 8: Marescq. 5th ed. 1888). 
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the Pope.7 Testimony of two uncontradicted witnesses8 or, if they 
were hearsay witnesses (testes de auditu), of five or seven of them,9 
was full evidence binding on the court. The testimony of women, 
no matter how many they were, was either inadmissible or counted 
only as one half of the evidence and had to be supplemented by the 
testimony of at least one man.10 In the hierarchy of testimonial val-
ues the nobleman ranked above the commoner, the clergyman 
above the layman, the rich above the poor, the old above the young, 
the Christian above the Jew.11 All proof was legally predetermined 
in arithmetical proportions: full proof (plena probatio), half (semi-
plena), one-fourth, one-eighth, and so on.12 The judge had to count 
proof, not weigh it-an understandable system considering that the 
judge did not see the witnesses, did not observe their behavior, and 
could not appreciate their sincerity or malice. The law, then, did 
the job for him-of course, in an abstract and a priori way. Num-
ber, sex, age, social and economic status, religion-these were the 
elements that made the "truth," not honesty and good faith ascer-
tained and appreciated in the concrete case.13 
7. This exception is affirmed, for instance, by a famous author of the sixteenth 
century, J. Cujacius, in his comment to the Decretales Gregorii IX, lib. II, tit. XX De 
testibus et attestationibus, cap. XXVII. See J. CuJAcms, ToMus SEXTUS OPERUM 
POSTUMORUM 859 (Napoli: Mutio. 1722). 
8. See, e.g., Engelmann, The Romano-Canonical Procedure, in ENGELMANN, supra 
note 1, at 480; Millar, supra note 3, at 44. With variations from place to place and 
from time to time, the proof of certain facts required testimony of a higher number 
of witnesses. For example, twelve or perhaps forty-four witnesses were required 
against a cardinal, 7 J. ,v1GMORE, supra note 6, at 242, and eight or sixteen• commoners 
(burgenses) were needed to prevail over a count or a baron. 2 G. SALVIOLI, STORIA DELLA 
PROCEDURA CIVILE E CRIMINALE 429 (Milano: Hoepli. 1927). 
9. See 1 M. CAPPELLETTI, LA TESTIMONIANZA DELLA PARTE NEL SISTEMA DELL'ORALITA 
138-39 n.18 (Milano: Giuffre. 1962). 
10. See 2 G. SALVIOLI, supra note 8, at 430-31. Cf. 2 E. GLASSON &: A. TISSIER, TRAITE 
THEORIQUE ET PRATIQUE D'ORGANISATION JUDICIAITRE, DE COMPETENCE ET DE PROCEDURE 
c1v1LE 779 n.1 (Paris: Sirey. 3d ed. 1926); R. MOREL, TRAITE ELEMENTAIRE DE PROCEDURE 
CIVILE 378 (Paris: Sirey. 2d ed. 1949). See note 149 infra. 
11. See references in M. CAPPELLETil &: J. PERILLO, supra note 1, at 35 n.140; 2 
G. SALVIOLI, supra note 8, at 427. Damasus in the thirteenth century summarized the 
requisites of a witness in the following couplet: "Conditio, sexus, aetas, discretio, fama 
Et fortuna, fides; in testibus ista requiras." DIE "SUMMA DE ORDINE JUDICIARIO" DES 
MAGIST.ER DAMASUs 43 (L. Wahrmund ed. Aalen: Scientia. Reprint 1962). The hierarchy 
of testimonial values was even more strongly enunciated in a famous work written 
about 1200, probably by the Glossator Pillius of Medicina: DER ORDo "INVOCATO 
CHRISTI NOMINE" 115 (L. Wahrmund ed. Aalen: Scientia. Reprint 1962) (" ••• ut potius 
sit credendum • • • seniori quam iuniori, honorato quam inferiori, masculo quam 
femine •••• Item potius • • • nobili quam ignobili •••• Item magis diviti quam 
pauperi'). 
12. See, e.g., 7 J. WIGMORE, supra note 6, at 241. 
13. See note 11 supra; note 149 infra and accompanying text. 
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A fourth feature of jus commune procedure was its segmental, 
piecemeal unfolding. Since the judge did not intervene and direct 
the proceedings, the parties or, rather, their attorneys, were the 
uncontrolled masters of the conduct of the case. Hence, abuses, dila-
tory tactics, and postponements were the usual plague.14 To cope 
with these abuses, the law tried to impose order by prescribing a 
series of compulsory and peremptory stages-a thirteenth century 
treatise enumerated eighteen of them in the ordinary case15-thus 
aggravating the already rigid and abstract character of procedural 
segmentation. The dilution of civil proceedings was further aggra-
vated by the fact that separate appeals had to be taken immediately 
from any kind of judicial decision at the risk of waiver-even from 
a partial or interlocutory decision, or one admitting or refusing evi-
dence. Thus, the principal case was frequently suspended.16 More-
over, new evidence and facts were not infrequently admissible in 
the courts of second instance-one more encouragement for ap-
peals.17 The usual course of a litigation, then, was a proliferation of 
derivative appellate proceedings, spreading outward like the numer-
ous branches of a big tree. 
The fifth and last characteristic of the procedure was the natural 
consequence of all the others: the enormously long duration of a 
civil case. Civil proceedings lasting for several decades were not 
unusual.18 
14. Under the older continental systems those principles which left the parties 
free to take or not to take a given step in the cause, to utilize or not to utilize any 
material relevant to the decision, to forward or to delay the progress of the cause, 
and rendered the court a purely passive instrumentality • • • , prevailed in a 
much more rigorous fashion than they ever did in our own [United States] 
system. 
Millar, Civil Procedure Reform in Civil Law Countries, in DAVID DUDLEY FIELD-
CENTENARY EssAYS 120, 130 (A. Reppy ed. New York: N.Y.U. School of Law. 1949). 
15. 1 G. CHIOVENDA, supra note 3, at 128-29. 
16. See I G. CHIOVENDA, supra note 3, at 121-22; Engelmann et al., Modern Con• 
tinental Procedure, in ENGELMANN, supra note 1, at 589 (in discussing the German and 
Austrian procedure in the period before the codification of the nineteenth century, 
the authors write that "too many modes of attack upon judgment were permitted. As a 
result even simple causes remained pending indefinitely'). 
17. Cf. H. BRIEGLEB, EINLEITUNG IN DIE THEORIE DER SUMMARISCHEN PROCESSE 85-95 
(Leipzig: Tauchnitz. 1859); G. WETZELL, SYSTEM DES ORDENTLICHEN CMLPROCESSFS 758-57 
(Leipzig: Tauchnitz. 3d ed. 1878). 
18. See, e.g., E. KERN, GESCHICHTE DES GERICHTSVERFASSUNGSRECHTS 31, 45-46 (Miinchen: 
Beck. 1954); A. TROLLER, VON DEN GRUNDLAGEN DES ZMLPROZESSUALEN FORMALISMUS 85-86 
(Basel: Helbing & Lichtenhahn. 1945) (' • •• proceedings lived longer than the parties 
and were inherited from generation to generation'); Engelmann et al., Modern Con-
tinental Procedure, in ENGELMANN, supra note 1, at 588 (" ••• all this dragged out the 
cause to interminable lengths'); Vollkommer, Die Zange Dauer der Zivilprozesse und 
ihre Ursachen, 81 ZEITSCHRIFT FiiR ZIVILPROZESS 102, 121-23 (1968) (' • •• proceedings last• 
ing thirty years or more were not uncommon'). See also H.-G. KIP, DAS SOGENANNTE 
MiiNDUCHKEITSPRINZIP 25 (Koln: Heymanns. 1952). 
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II. THE ERA OF REFORM 
This, then, was still the situation on the Continent on the eve of 
the French Revolution, somewhat improved here or there,19 yet fur-
ther corrupted by other features of that era, such as: (1) the multi-
plicity of jurisdictions-royal, feudal, ecclesiastical, and so forth-
based on the typical privileges and the nonegalitarian structure of 
the ancien regime society;20 and (2) the patrimonial, venal character 
of the administration of justice, which particularly in France was 
not a public service in the modern sense but rather a property right 
of the judges, who had either inherited or bought the judgeship 
and who had to be paid for their services by the parties.21 
The dismantling of such a system was commenced, but not 
achieved, by the French Revolution. After 1789, the sale and inheri-
tance of judicial offices were forbidden. A loi of August 16-24, 
1790, abolished the privileged jurisdictions as being in conflict with 
the revolutionary idea of egalite in the new bourgeois state.22 The 
same loi proclaimed the gratuitous character of the judicial func-
tion (gratuite de la justice), with the new judges compensated not by 
the parties but by the state.23 The loi of 7 Fructidor of the Year III 
(1795) further abolished the secret character of the taking of testi-
monial evidence (Principe du secret de l' enquete), establishing in-
stead that the witnesses had to be heard at the public hearing in the 
19. All over Europe, summary types of procedure were developed in order to at-
tenuate the formalism of the ordinary jus commune procedure. See generally, e.g., 
H. BruEGLEB, supra note 17. 
20. See, e.g., 1 G. CHIOVENDA, supra note 3, at 132, 134; 1 M. RoussELET, HISTOIRE DE 
LA MAGISTRATURE FRANyAISE 4-19 and passim (Paris: Plon. 1957). In particular for 
Germany, see E."DoHRING, GESCHICHTE DER DEUTSCHEN RECHTSPFLEGE SEIT 1500, 8-14, 19, 
71 (Berlin: Duncker 8e Humblot. 1953); E. KERN, supra note 18, at 78, 105, 151. For 
Italy, see 2 G. SALVIOLI, supra note 8, at 74-137. 
21. See, e.g., 1 G. CHIOVENDA, supra note 3, at 132, 134; J. DAWSON, THE ORACLES OF 
THE LAW 350-62 (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Law School. 1968); P. HERZOG, 
CIVIL PROCEDURE IN FRANCE 45 n.132 (The Hague: Nijhoff. 1967): 1 M. RoussELET, 
supra note 20, at 92-100; 2 M. RoussELET, supra note 20, at 227-34. For the description 
of a similar, but less extreme and widespread, situation in Germany, Spain, Holland, 
and Italy, see, e.g., J. DAWSON, supra, at 247-48; E. DOHRING, supra note 20, at 52-53, 55, 
75-88, 96-105; 2 G. SALVIOLI, supra note 8, at 738-39. The fee system was not a charac-
teristic of the Civil-Law orbit alone. For England and the United States, see 1 W. 
HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw 254 (London: Methuen 8e Sweet and Maxwell. 
7th ed. 1956, reprinted 1966); 5 R. PouND, JURISPRUDENCE 669-71 (St. Paul, Minn.: West 
Publishing. 1959). See also J. DAWSON, supra, at 352-53. 
22. Law of August 16-24, 1790 (tit. II, art. 16). See, e.g., P. CATALA 8e F. TERRE, 
PROCEDURE CIVILE ET VOIES D'EXECUTION 18 (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. 
1965); I G. CmovENDA, supra note 3, at 134. On the abolition of the venal character of 
judicial offices in 1789 see, e.g., J. DAWSON, supra note 21, at 375-76; 1 M. RousSELET, 
supra note 20, at 116, 123. 
23. Law of August 16-24, 1790 (tit. Il, art. 11). See, e.g., P. CATALA 8e F. TERRE, supra 
note 22, at 19. 
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presence of the parties.24 Finally, the "formal system of proof" was 
radically attacked by the French reformers and the new concept of 
free judicial evaluation of evidence affirmed, although many archaic 
relics of the previous system outlived the revolutionary storm.26 
Most, but not all of these radical changes were adopted by the 
Napoleonic codes. Significantly, the code de procedure civile of 1806 
returned in part to the secrecy of testimonial proof-taking. Under 
this code, testimonial evidence no longer was taken by the adjudicat-
ing court at a public hearing, but was to be taken by a juge-commis-
saire, in the presence of the parties but not of the general public.26 
Thus, as lamented by French authors, since the judge-commissioner 
had to write down the witnesses' depositions, and since he would 
not be the adjudicating judge, the latter would only have before him 
a piece of paper, without physiognomy.27 
But the reform movement, at last unchained, could not forever 
be so confined. It was in fact the natural outgrowth, as will be further 
seen, of the needs of a new liberal, bourgeois society, of the new 
intellectual and economic fabric of nineteenth and early twentieth 
century Europe. Thus, it would be improper to reduce the history 
of such a movement to recounting the individual accomplishments of 
"great" personalities. Yet, at least in the field of law and legal reform, 
individual greatness has meant, above all, a greater capacity to 
interpret the new general needs and new social demands, and to 
provide appropriate solutions to the new ideological and political 
problems. The "science" of procedure in the opening period of the 
reform movement is identified with men who showed that capacity. 
The long list includes Pagano in Italy, Bellot in Switzerland, Feuer-
bach and Mittermaier in Germany, and, above all, Jeremy Bentham, 
with his sharp, brutal, cutting critique of the past-an outsider, 
yet fully introduced into the Continent by a famous and early trans-
lation into French of his legal ·writings.28 P.F. Bellot openly recog-
24. See, e.g., E. BONNIER, supra note 6, § 248, at 225-26; M. CAl'PELLEITI, supra note 
4, at 43-44 n.87; 2 E. GLASSON &: A. TrssIER, supra note 10, at 781. 
25. See, e.g., Engelmann et al., Modem Continental Procedure, in ENGELMANN, supra 
note 1, at 758; Millar, supra note 3, at 45-46. 
26. See, e.g., Engelmann et al., Modern Continental Procedure, in ENGELMANN, supra 
note 1, at 760. 
27. See, e.g., E. BONNIER, ELEMENTS DE PROCEDURE CIVILE 230, 241, 243-44 (Paris: Pion. 
1853); 2 E. GLASSON &: A. TISSIER, supra note 10, at 781; R. MoREL, supra note 10, at 392. 
28. E. Dumont translated Bentham's works into French. He published the first three 
volumes of his translations in Paris in 1802. See Dumont, Preface to 2 OEUVRES DE J. 
BENTHAM (E. Dumont transl. Bruxelles: Hauman et Co. 1829). Much of Bentham's 
legal writings were first published in French; their influence on the Continent was 
very significant. See Millar, supra note 14, at 1!17. 
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nized Bentham's influence in the preface to his code de procedure 
civile of Geneva of 1819: "I owe to the friendship of Monsieur Du-
mont my acquaintance with the ... manuscripts, as yet unpub-
lished, of Bentham on procedure; I wish to recognize that they have 
often proved useful in the course of my work."29 
You may know more than I about the revolution in the field of 
civil procedure that, mostly under the pressure of Benthamite criti-
cism, was soon to occur in England and in this country as well. 
Indeed, it was a very understandable revolution. Procedure in equity 
was very much akin to the jus commune procedure, some character-
istics of which we have already examined: predominance of writing,30 
secret taking of evidence by examiners or commissioners,31 numerical 
evaluation of testimonial evidence,32 and incredible delay.33 But 
procedure at law was not much better. There, too, the course of a 
civil litigation was stifled by formalism and technicalities, with the 
jury insulated from the facts by a long list of a priori, abstract dis-
qualifications and exclusions. For instance, the parties, any third 
person interested in any way in the case, persons convicted of crimes, 
and others were not allowed to testify.34 
On the Continent, the great reform movement presented itself 
under an overarching and yet too often misleading symbolic name: 
"orality." What it meant, however, was much more than a mere 
reaction against the prevalence of writing in the jus commune 
29. Quoted in E. SCHURTER & H. FRITZSCHE, DIE GESCHICHTLICHEN GRUNDLAGEN DER 
KANTONALEN RECHTE 20 (Ziirich: Rascher. 1931). For an analysis and evaluation of 
Bellot's legislative work see id. at 16-48. 
30. See 9 w. HoLDSWORTII, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw 337, 353-58 (London: Methuen 
& Sweet and Maxwell. 3d ed. 1944, reprinted 1966); A. JoHNES, SUGGESTIONS FOR A 
REFORM OF 'IHE COURT OF CHANCERY BY A UNION OF TIIE JURISDICTIONS OF EQUITY AND 
LAW iii, 85-103 (London: Saunders & Benning. 1834); R. MILLAR, CIVIL PROCEDURE OF 
THE TRIAL COURT IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 25, 36-37 (New York: The Law Center of 
New York University, 1952); Yale, Introduction to LoRD NornNGHAM's "'MANUAL OF 
CHANCERY PRACTICE' AND 'PROLEGOMENA OF CHANCERY AND EQUITY'" 58 (D. Yale ed. 
Cambridge: University Press. 1965). 
31. See 9 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 30, at 337, 353-58; R. MILLAR, supra note 30, 
at 25, 36-37; Yale, supra note 30, at 59-61. 
32. See R. GRESLEY, A TREATISE ON TIIE LAw OF EVIDENCE 4 (London: Saunders & 
Benning. 1836) (" ••• the courts of equity followed the maxim of the civil law, responsio 
unius non omnino audiatur, and required the evidence of two witnesses as the founda-
tion for a decree"); 1 J. WIGMORE, supra note 6, at 15-16; 7 J. WIGMORE, supra note 6, 
at 290-94. Only some of the many jus commune rules of numerical evaluation of 
evidence were adopted by the courts of equity, most notably the rule that the 
testimony of only one witness was not sufficient. See, e.g., 7 J. WIGMORE, supra, at 254; 
Millar, supra note 3, at 49. 
33. See, e.g., 9 W. HOLDSWORTII, supra note 30, at 356, 358-71; Yale, supra note 30, 
at 58, 61-65. 
34. See, e.g., 9 W. HOLDSWORTII, supra note 30, at 189-97; 2 J. WIGMORE, supra note 
6, at 602-32, 674-753. 
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and derivative proceedings. It meant a reaction against, and a radical 
break with, all those characteristics of the jus commune that we men-
tioned before. Thus, in addition to a revaluation of the oral element 
in procedure, the leading ideals of the reform movement were the 
following: first, "immediacy"-that is, a direct, personal, open rela-
tionship between the adjudicating organ and the parties, the wit-
nesses, and the other sources of proof; second, "free" or, more 
precisely, "critical" evaluation of evidence, unfettered by a priori 
rules of exclusion or evaluation, and based on the direct observation 
of the evidentiary elements by the judge in open court; third, "con-
centration" of the case in a single hearing or in a few closely spaced 
oral sessions before the court, carefully prepared through a prelim-
inary stage in which writings were not necessarily to be excluded; 
finally, and as a consequence of the first three ideals, a more rapid 
unfolding of the litigation. 
These were the openly declared goals of the most progressive 
critiques, proposals, and legislative reforms throughout the nine-
teenth century in Europe; and these have continued to be the goals 
of reformers deep into our century.35 The two landmarks of the 
movement36 were the German Code of Civil Procedure of 1877 and 
the extremely influential, more radically innovative Austrian Code 
of 1895.37 The major innovation of the Austrian Code was its em-
phasis on a more active role for the judge both in expediting the 
proceeding and in promoting the social aim of effective equality of 
the parties. The crucial institution for this role was the personal, 
"oral" contact of the judge with the litigants, assisted but not sub-
stituted by their counsel.38 
35. For more details and references see M. CAPPELLETII, supra note 4, at 41-59, 89-92. 
36. In this context, the Code of Civil Procedure of Hanover of 1850 and the 
Austrian law on small claims procedure (Bagatellverfahren) of 1873 also deserve to 
be mentioned. On the Code of Hanover see, e.g., 1 A. 'WACH, HANDBUCH DES DEursCHEN 
CIVILPROZESSRECHTS 138-41 (Leipzig: Duncker 8e Humblot. 1885); Engelmann et al., 
Modern Continental Procedure, in ENGELMANN, supra note 1, at 598-99. On the 
Austrian Bagatellverfahren see, e.g., F. KLEIN 8e F. ENGEL, DER ZIVILPROZESS OESTER· 
REICHS 40-41 (Mannheim: Bensheimer. 1927); Engelmann et al., supra, at 633. 
37. The German Zivilprozessordnung of January 30, 1877 has been in force since 
October 1, 1879, with a number of significant amendments. The Austrian Zivil-
prozessordnung of August 1, 1895 has been in force since January 1, 1898. 
38. Sections 182 and 183 of the Austrian Code contain the essential provisions 
concerning the social aspect of the judge's active role; they give the judge the power 
and duty to promote a decision based on a complete analysis of the merits of the case. 
To this end, he must advise the parties of any procedural error or incompleteness in 
their presentation of the facts. He may on his own motion call the parties to appear 
personally before him, order the production of documents, call witnesses, and order 
expert testimony. See notes 54 8e 135 infra and accompanying text. Sections 182 and 
183 were adopted almost literally in a series of amendments to the German Code in 
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These two landmarks were followed by a number of further 
statutory developments, all of which were more or less modeled on 
the first two. They included the Hungarian Code of 1911,39 the 
Norwegian Code of 1915,40 the Danish Code of 1916,41 the 1929 Code 
of Yugoslavia,42 the 1933 Code of Poland,43 the 1942 Code of 
Sweden,44 and the Swiss federal law of civil procedure of 1947.45 
III. THE !MPAGr OF THE REFORM MOVEMENT ON DELAY 
The natural question at this point is: what was the practical 
impact of such a large reform movement in Continental Europe? I 
have chosen for examination only one of the typical features of the 
1909, 1924, and 1933. See German Zivilprozessordnung § 139; Baur, Zeit• und Geistes• 
striimungen im Prozess, 92 JURISTISCHE BLATTER 445, 446 (1970). 
The judge's powers to speed up the proceeding are provided for in other sections 
of the Austrian Code, such as §§ 87 and 179. These powers also served as a model for 
the German reforms. See German Zivilprozessordnung §§ 261b and 279a; Habscheid, 
Richtermacht oder Parteifreiheit, 81 ZEITSCHRIFl' FUR ZIVILPROZESS 175, 180 (1968). 
On the extraordinary influence of the Austrian Code upon the legislation of 
various countries, see, e.g., Satter, Das Werk Franz Kleins und sein Einfluss auf die 
neueren Prozessgesetze, 60 ZEITSCHRIFl' FUR DEUTSCHEN ZIVILPROZESS 272 (1936-37); 
Schima, Der Einfluss der iisterreichischen ]ustizgesetze auf das europiiische Ausland, in 
.ALMANACH DER STADT WIEN 1960, at 80-89. 
39. The Hungarian Code of Civil Procedure of 1911 was the valuable work of 
A. Pl6sz, Like the Austrian Code of 1895, it was inspired by the ideals of orality, im-
mediacy, concentration, and free evaluation of evidence. See, e.g., Fabinyi, Das un-
garische Prozessrecht, in DER ZIVILPROZESS IN DEN EUROPAISCHEN STAATEN UND !HREN 
KoLONIEN 265, 267, 279-82 (F. Leske&: W. Loewenfeld eds. Berlin: Heymanns. 2d ed. 
1933). 
40. The Code of Civil Procedure of Norway, enacted in 1915 but in force only since 
1927, was also modeled after the codes of Austria and Germany. See Alten, Das Zivil-
prozessrecht in Norwegen, in DER ZIVILPROZESS IN DEN EUROPAISCHEN STAATEN UND !HREN 
KoLONIEN, supra note 39, at 483, 484. 
41. The Danish Code of Civil Procedure of 1916, in force since 1919, also adopted 
the criteria of orality, immediacy, and free evaluation of evidence; it was strongly in-
fluenced by the Austrian model. See, e.g., H. MUNCH-PETERSEN, DER ZIVILPROZESS DANE• 
MARKS 50-58, 78-81 (Mannheim: Bensheimer. 1932). 
42, The Yugoslav Code of Civil Procedure of 1929 was almost a literal copy of the 
Austrian code. See Peritch, Anhang: Die auf dem Gebiete der Gerichtsorganisation und 
des Zivilprozesses fur ganz ]ugoslavien gemeinsamen Gesetze, in DER ZIVILPROZESS IN DEN 
EUROPAISCHEN STAATEN UND IHREN KOLONIEN, supra note 39, at 619, 625 n.18. 
43. The Polish Code of Civil Procedure of 1933 was also inspired by the same 
principles. See, e.g., R. KANN, DIE POLNISCHE ZIVILPROZESSORDNUNG 98 (Berlin: Hey-
manns, 1933); Stelmachowski, Das Zivilprozessrecht in Polen, in DER ZIVILPROZESS 
IN DEN EUROPAISCHEN STAATEN UND !HREN KOLONIEN, supra note 39, at 695, 705-06. 
44. The principal goal of the Swedish Code of Procedure of 1942, in force since 
1948, was to establish a procedure based on the criteria of orality and related principles. 
See, e.g., Simson, Das neue schwedische Zivilprozessrecht, 63 ZEITSCHRIFT FUR SCHWEIZER· 
ISCHES R.EcHT 122, 139-41 (1944). On the similarities of the Swedish Code and the 
Austrian Code, see Welamson, 6sterreichisches und schwedisches Zivilprozessrecht, 9 
ZEITSCHRIFl' FUR R.ECHTSVERGLEICHUNG 214, 217-18, 223 (1968). 
45. See generally M. GULDENER, SCHWEIZERISCHES ZIVILPROZESSRECHT 56, 453-58 (Ziirich: 
Schulthess. 2d ed. 1958). 
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pre-reform procedure, a feature that, however, was the natural con-
sequence of all the others: delay-enormous, unbearable delay. 
Judicial statistics in those countries where the reform movement 
has been consistently implemented are extremely eloquent. Toward 
the end of the nineteenth century a prominent German proce-
duralist, Adolf Wach, praised the success of the German Code of 
1877 on the basis of the following figures: in the higher courts of first 
instance, the Landgerichte, twenty-seven per cent of all civil litiga-
tion was terminated within three months after the commencement 
of the case, another 28.7 per cent within three to six months, and still 
another 28.7 per cent within six months to one year; in the lower 
courts of first instance, the Amtsgerichte, 63.5 per cent of the con-
tentious civil proceedings were decided in less than three months and 
another 22.8 per cent were decided within three to six months.46 
The situation has not deteriorated in recent times. In a typical 
year, 1968, more than sixty per cent of the contentious civil proceed-
ings in the Landgerichte and more than eighty per cent in the 
Amtsgerichte were terminated in less than six months.47 
Notwithstanding this impressive record, our German brethren 
still often complain about the excessive duration of civil litigation in 
their country.48 Indeed, they have at least two main reasons to com-
46. A. Vv ACH, DIE MiiNDLICHKEIT IN DEM ENTWURF DER OSTERREICHISCHEN CIVILPROCESS· 
ORDNUNG 21, 60 (Leipzig: Edelmann. 1895) (statistics for 1891 and 1893), See G. CHIO· 
VENDA, Lo stato attuale del processo civile in Italia e il progetto Orlando di riforme 
processuali, in I SAGGI DI DIRITIO PROCESSUALE CIVILE 395, 405 (Roma: Faro italiano. 
1930); A. WACH, Mitndlichkeit und Schriftlichkeit, in VoRTRAGE iiBER DIE RE!CHS· 
CrvILPROCESSORDNUNG 45 (Bonn: Marcus. 2d ed. 1896). Vollkommer gives the following 
information about the judicial statistics for the years 1888-1889: 56% of all contentious 
civil cases before the Landgerichte were terminated in less than six months, while 
16% took more than one year (48% and 20% respectively for proceedings before the 
Oberlandesgerichte, i.e., the courts of appeal). Vollkommer, supra note 18, at 124. 
47. Detailed statistical tables based on information from the statistisches Bundesamt 
in Wiesbaden and the Ministry of Justice in Bonn can be found in M. CAPP.ELLETI'I, 
supra note 4, at 61-63. 
Note, however, that if one considers only contentious proceedings terminated with 
a judgment, the percentage of cases decided in less than six months becomes about 
60% for both the Amtsgerichte and the Landgerichte. Moreover, if one considers only 
the ordinary contentious proceedings terminated with a judgment in the Landgerichte, 
thus excluding all special proceedings such as those involving matrimonial and 
legitimacy matters, the statistics for 1968 indicate that the percentage of cases lasting 
less than six months ranged from a minimum of 31.8% in Baden-Wiirttemberg to a 
maximum of 48.4% in the Land Bremen, while the percentage of cases lasting more 
than one year ranged from a minimum of 21.1 % in West Berlin to a maximum of 
33.1% in Baden-Wiirttemberg. See the statistics published in Anlage zur Stellungnahme 
des ZPO- und GVG-Ausschusses des DAV zum Regierungsentwurf der Beschleu-
nigungsnovelle. Ziihlkartenstatistik 1968, in 20 ANWALTSBLA'IT 161, 162 (1970). 
48. See, e.g., J. BAUMANN &: G. FEZER, BESCHLEUNIGUNG DES ZIVILPROZESSES (Tiibingen: 
Mohr. 1970); F. BAUR, WEGE zu EINER KONZENTRATION DER MUNDLICHEN VERHANDLUNG 
IM PRoZESS (Berlin: de Gruyter. 1966); Henke, ]udicia perpetua oder: Warum Prozesse 
so Zange dauern ••• , 83 ZEITSCHRIFr FUR ZIVILPR.OZESS 125 (1970); Schubert, Das Streben 
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plain. First, there still exists in Germany a remnant of that undue 
"glorification" of appellate courts and proceedings, which, as we 
have seen, was a typical feature of jus commune times. Thus, appeal 
to the courts of second instance still tends to involve a de novo ex-
amination of the case. As a consequence, appeals are quite fre-
quent, 40 and the over-all duration of litigation is greatly increased. 
In other countries, however, such as Austria, where the ideals of 
the reform movement admittedly have been implemented in a less 
dogmatic, yet more consistent and realistic way, this defect has been 
practically eliminated.rm 
Second, compared to the results of the reform movement in other 
countries, the German figures are still far from being fully satis-
factory.111 The judicial statistics for Austria indicate that, in recent 
years, the average duration of a civil case was only fifty to sixty days 
in the Bezirksgerichte-which decide the bulk of civil litigation-
and about 145 days in the Gerichtshofe Erster lnstanz-the higher 
courts of first instance.112 The statistics also indicate that only an 
insignificant fraction of civil cases last longer than one year.113 It 
should be noted that this fact is not simply the impressive but 
inconclusive result of administering justice in a small, orderly 
country. Soon after the Austrian Code of 1895 went into effect, when 
nach Prozessbeschleunigung und Yerfahrensgliederung im Zivilprozessrecht des 19. 
]ahrhunderts, 85 ZEITSCHRIFr DER SAVIGNY-SWiTUNG FilR R.ECHTSGESCHICHTE 127 (1968); 
Vollkommer, supra note 18. 
49. For comparative data, which indicate that appeals are strikingly more frequent 
in Germany than in England, see F. A. MANN, DIE DEtrrSCHE JusrlZREFORM IM LICHT 
ENGLISCHER ERFAHRUNG 5-6 (Karlsruhe: Milller. 1965). A strong trend toward limitation 
of appeals in Germany is evident. See, e.g., F. BAUR, supra note 48, at 3, 23; BuNDES-
JUS!lZMINISTERIUM, BERICHT DER KOMMISSION ZUR VORBEREITUNG EINER REFORM DER 
ZIVILGERICHTSBARKErr 117, 125-115 (Bonn: Deutscher Bundes-Verlag. 1961); Baur, supra 
note 38, at 451-53; Zweigert, Zurn richterlichen Charisma in einer ethisierten Rechts-
ordnung, in FEsrGABE FUR CARLO SCHMID 299, 1107-08 (Tiibingen: Mohr. 1962). 
50. On the principle of "limited appeal" (beschriinkte Berufung) adopted by the 
Austrian Code see, e.g., G. PETSCHEK & F. STAGEL, DER OsrERREICHISCHE ZIVILPROZESS 364 
(Wien: Manzsche Verlags- und Universitatsbuchhandlung. 1963). 
51. This is attributed, in part, to the fact that in Germany the powers of the 
judge to conduct and speed up the unfolding of the proceeding, modeled on the 
Austrian Code but mostly discretionary, are not used in a sufficiently rigorous and 
consistent way. See, e.g., F. BAUR, supra note 48, at 12-13; Baumgartel, Welche 
Anregungen vermag das neue griechische Zivilprozessgesetzbuch fur die in Deutschland 
geplante Prozessbeschleunigung zu geben1, 81 ZEITSCHRIFT FUR ZIVILPROZESS 6, 9-10 (1968); 
Vollkommer, supra note 18, at 121. 
52. See Bajons, Buchbesprechung, 10 ZEITsCHRIFr FUR R.EcHTSVERGLEICHUNG 818, 820 
(1969), 
58. See STATIS!IK DER R.ECHTSPFLEGE FUR DAS JAHR 1968, at 20 (Wien: Csterreichisches 
Statistisches Zentralamt. 1969), and for an analysis of these statistics M. CAPPELLETTI, 
supra note 4, at 64 n.144. The statistics for 1969 do not show relevant changes. See 
STATISTIK DER RECH'I'sPFLEGE FUR DAS JAHa 1969, at 20 (1970). 
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Austria was a large empire with world-wide intellectual and political 
ambitions, Franz Klein, the superb drafter of the Code, could proudly 
affirm that the reform's goals were already achieved; proceedings had 
become "simple, inexpensive, quick, and accessible to the poor."5¼ 
Precise statistical data were given by him to prove this strong state-
ment, showing the strikingly radical change ("die grosse Umwlilz-
ung") in the duration of pre- and post-reform cases. 55 
Finally, I want to mention briefly still another country that has 
implemented the reform movement. In Sweden the official statistics 
for 1967 indicate that the average duration of civil litigation is two 
months from the date of filing to disposition of the case, with 33.5 
per cent of all civil cases in courts of first instance terminated within 
one month, 51.4 per cent within one to six months, and only 15.1 
per cent lasting for more than six months. 56 
Such data speak, I think, with a clearer voice than multi-volume 
treatises. Although it is unquestionable that circumstances other than 
the form of procedure may also produce delay-such as insufficient 
staffing of the courts with judicial and clerical personnel, inadequate 
court organization, and flaws in the substantive law-the recent 
developments in Europe clearly demonstrate that the movement 
toward "orality" has greatly helped to speed up the proceedings. 
This conclusion seems to be confirmed by the fact that delay still 
plagues civil proceedings in those other countries of Europe in which 
the reform movement has not, or has only partially, been imple-
mented. In Italy, in Spain, and to some extent even in France, the 
unfolding of a civil case still resembles the efforts to start the broken 
mechanism of a clock which "must be hit and shaken in order to be 
put in motion even for a brief moment."57 Shaking and beating is 
54. 1 F. KLEIN, REDEN, VORTRAGE, AUFSATZE, BRIEFE 87 (Wien: Manzsche Verlags-
und Universitatsbuchhandlung. 1927). 
55. Id. at 88. More data can be found in F. KLEIN, VoRLESuNGEN UBER DIE PRAXIS 
DES CIVILPROCE'SSES 7-9 (Wien: Manz. 1900); F. KLEIN &: F. ENGEL, supra note 36, at 330-
38; Leonhard, Zur Geschichte der osterreichischen ]ustizreform vom ]ahre 1898, in 
F.ESl'SCHRIFT ZUR FiiNFZIGJAHRFEIER DER OSTERREICHISCHEN ZIVILPROZESSORDNUNG 1898-1948, 
at 125, 152-54 (Wien: Manz. 1948). For instance, in 1898 there was a dramatic increase 
in the percentage of cases showing a duration of less than six months from the time 
of filing in the court of first instance to their termination in the court of second 
instance. Such a percentage sprang from 1.9% in prereform cases to 48.2% in one 
district, from 3,4% to 68.7% in another, and from 7.3% to 70% in still another. 
1 F. KLEIN, supra note 54, at 88. Further data would not add anything to this over-all 
picture. 
56. Professor P.O. Ekelof of Uppsala kindly furnished me with the information in 
the text. 
57. This image is taken from the incisive description of prereform civil procedure 
by a prominent Austrian legal scholar, A. MENGER, DAS BiiRGERLICHE RECHT UND DIE 
BESITZLOSEN VOLKSKLASSEN, ch. I § 11 (Tubingen: Laup. 1908). 
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done by party writings, and party writings in tum are prepared by 
counsel, who do not necessarily suffer from court delay; there is 
virtually no hearing in which the adjudicating court, not a mere 
judge-commissioner, meets with the parties and the witnesses; the 
decision is based on paper, not direct observation, and paper, of 
course, may be gathered piecemeal; and finally, the previously noted 
"glorification" of appeals still prevails. 
Thus we have an average duration of eighteen and twenty-eight 
months respectively for an ordinary proceeding of first instance in 
Italy, before the lower and the higher courts of first instance;58 one 
of ten months in the Tribunaux de grande instance in France;59 and 
one of eight months in the ]uzgados de primera instancia in Spain.60 
Many Latin American countries do not count duration by days or 
months, but by years;61 no wonder, since their procedure resembles 
jus commune procedure even more closely than does that of Italy or 
Spain.62 
58. Detailed statistical data can be found in M. CAPPELLETII, supra note 4, at 65-66; 
M. CAPPELLETII, J. MERRYMAN&: J. PERILLO, THE ITALIAN LEGAL SYSTEM 125-26 (Stan-
ford, Calif.: Stanford University Press. 1967). 
59. Civil procedure in the lower courts of first instance (Tribunaux d'instance) is 
notably different from that in the higher courts (Tribunaux de grande instance). Only 
in the lower courts is procedure primarily oral. See Lobin, Procedure t!crite et procedure 
orate, in trUDES DE DROIT CONTEMPORAIN 161, 163, 166 (Paris: Les Editions de l'Epargne, 
1970). Significantly, the average duration of civil proceedings of first instance changes 
dramatically from the lower courts (seventy-three days in 1966) to the higher courts 
(304 days in the same year). See ANNUAIRE STATJSTIQUE DE LA FRANCE 1968, at 129 (Paris: 
Institut National de la Statistique et des l\:tudes Economiques. 1969). See also P. HERZOG, 
supra note 21, at 139. 
In France, repeated attempts have been made to enlarge the judges' power to 
control and speed up litig:ition, particularly in 1935, 1958, 1965, and 1967. See, e.g., 
J. VINCENT, PRtcIS DE PROCEDURE CIVILE 440-46, 472 (Paris: Dalloz. 14th ed. 1969). 
60. See ESTADfsnCAS JUDICIALES DE EsPANA. ANo 1966, at 123 (Madrid: Instituto 
Nacional de Estadfstica. 1967). It should be noted that, particularly in the cases of 
Spain and France, the official statistics used for our calculations seem less complete than 
would be desirable. Private information suggests a greater delay in Spain than that 
indicated by these statistics. In fact, the excessive duration of ordinary civil proceed-
ings in Spain is generally recognized. See, e.g., I L. PRIETo-CASTRo FERRANDIZ, DERECHO 
PRoCESAL CIVIL 358 (Madrid: Editorial Revista de Derecho Privado. 1964). The same 
author secs this defect as a consequence of the written character of ordinary proceed-
ings, which are still closely tied to the principles of jus commune procedure. Id, at 
354-60. 
All of the figures concerning the average duration of litigation given in this 
Pl+ P2 
Article were derived from the formula used by statisticians, i.e. ---= d. 
I+C 
Pl represents the number of proceedings pending at the beginning of the year, P2 the 
number of proceedings pending at the end of the year, I the number of proceedings 
initiated during the year, and C the number of cases concluded during the year; d gives 
the average duration in years and fractions of years. 
61, See M. CAPPELLETII, supra note 4, at 66 n.150 (based on Latin American reports 
not yet published). 
62, Id. at 22 n.39. 
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This, then, is a summary account of the development of civil 
procedure in continental Europe in the recent past-apart from that 
great schism of Eastern Europe which we will discuss· later. 
IV. CURRENT PROBLEMS AND TRENDS-CONSTITUTIONAL, 
INTERNATIONAL, AND SOCIAL 
Naturally, the "orality" movement, with all its derivative ideas, 
is still very much alive as a basis for criticism and reform proposals 
in countries, such as Spain63 or Italy,64 where too many remnants of 
the old procedure prevail. In those countries, immediacy and con-
centration, efficiency and rapidity are still the problems. 
In addition, however, a number of unprecedented problems have 
lately emerged throughout the Continent-at least the Western part 
of the Continent-that are typical reflections of a new reality and a 
new society. I will briefly examine only three of them: the "constitu-
tional" problem; the "community" and "international" problem; 
and the "social" problem. 
First, let us examine the constitutional problem. Emerging from 
a disastrous war and an oppressive experience of political organiza-
tion and ideological credo, several European nations, including Ger-
many, Italy, and Austria, have turned to constitutional guarantees 
as an anchor against similar storms. 65 As a first step, they have 
adopted "rigid" constitutions-an innovation for Italy,66 although 
not for Germany and Austria-and they have granted constitutional 
status to some ideals of judicial administration such as judicial in-
dependence, the right to an impartial judge whose jurisdiction is 
predetermined by law, the right to counsel, and the right to be 
heard. 67 As a second step, they have instituted special constitutional 
courts68-an innovation for Italy and in effect also for Ger-
63. See, e.g., I L. PRIETo-CASTRo FERRANDIZ, supra note 60, at 355; de Miguel, Los 
sistemas sabre la forma de la actividad procesal, REVISTA DE Esrun10s PROCESAW, No. 
5, Sept. 1970 (at 1-11 of the reprint). 
64. See, e.g., M. CAPPELLETI'l, supra note 9, vols. I and 2. 
65. See Cole, Three Constitutional Courts: A Comparison, 53 AM. PoL. Ser. REV. 
963; 965, 967, 983 (1959); Friedrich, The Political Theory of the New Democratic Con-
stitutions, 12 REv. OF POLITIC:S 215, 217-18 (1950). 
66. The Statuto Albertina of 1848, completely superseded only by the "rigid" Con-
stitution of 1948, was an example of a nonrigid constitution. It could be changed by 
ordinary legislation without the necessity of any special amendment procedure. 
67. Italian Constitution in force since 1948, arts. 24, 25, 101, 102, 104, 107, 108; 
German Constitution (Bonner Grundgesetz) in force since 1949, arts. 20, 92, 97, 101, 
103; Austrian Constitution of 1920 (amended in 1929 and re-enacted in 1945), arts. 88, 
87, 88, 90, 94 (not including provisions on right to counsel and right to be heard; 
however, the provisions of art. 6 of the European Convention of Human Rights have 
been constitutionalized in Austria. See notes 89, 90 infra and accompanying text). 
68. See M. CAPPELLETI'I, JUDICIAL REVmw IN THE CoNTEMPORARY WORLD (Indianap-
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many,60 though not for Austria70-entrusting them with the specific 
task of controlling the observance and implementation of the consti-
tution by governmental organs, especially the legislature. To be sure, 
the American precedent of judicial review has played an influential 
role in this development. France, of course, has not followed the 
lead;71 yet, it is noteworthy that the Conseil Constitutionnel of the 
1958 French Constitution, although its role is to safeguard the 
supremacy of the executive rather than to protect individual rights, 
is less remote from a real constitutional court than was its unsuccess-
ful predecessor under the 1946 Constitution, the Comite Constitu-
tionnel.12 On the other hand, other countries have followed the 
olis: Bobbs-Merrill. 1971); Geck, Judicial Review of Statutes: A Comparative Survey of 
Present Institutions and Practices, 51 CORNELL L.Q. 250 (1966). 
69. Although there were some precedents for the present Bundesverfassungsgericht 
in Germany, most notably the Staatsgerichtshof under the Weimar Republic, none of 
them had a general power to review the constitutionality of legislation. See, e.g., H. 
SPANNER, DIE RICHTERLICHE PRiiFUNG VON GESETZEN UND VERORDNUNGEN 6 (Wien: Springer. 
1951); Friesenhahn, Die Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit in der Bundesrepublik Deutsch/and, 
in MAX-PLANCK-INSTITUT FUR AUSLANDISCHES OFFENTLICHES RECHT UND VoLKERRECHT, 
VERFASSUNGSGERICHTSBARKEIT IN DER GEGENWART 89, 92-99 (H. Mosler ed. Koln-Berlin: 
Heymanns. 1962). 
70. The Austrian Constitution of 1920 had already established a special constitu-
tional court called Verfassungsgerichtshof. Arts. 89, 137-48. 
71. The reasons-historical, ideological, and practical-for France's constant refusal 
to introduce judicial review of legislation are analyzed in M. CAPPELLETTI, supra note 
68, at ch. 2, § 4. See G. BORDEAU, DROIT CONSTITUTIONNEL ET INSTITUTIONS POLmQUES 
104-06 {Paris: Librairie Generale de Droit et de Jurisprudence. 14th ed. 1969). 
72. See, e.g., BuRDEAU, supra note 71, at 109-13; Eisenmann 8:: Hamon, La juridiction 
Constitutionnelle en Droit Franrais, in MAX-PLANCK-INSTITUT, supra note 69, at 231, 237, 
242-43, 255-57; Waline, The Constitutional Coundl of the French Republic, 12 AM. J. 
CoMP. L. 483, 484-85, 488, 492-93 (1963). In the restrictive application given so far 
to articles 61 and 62 of the 1958 Constitution, the Conseil Constitutionnel's principal 
function has only been to guarantee that the legislature will not interfere with the 
large sphere of new "legislative power" of the executive. One of the central provisions 
of the Constitution, article 34, lists the areas that are reserved to the legislature; civil 
procedure, for example, is not included. Matters other than those listed in article 34 
belong to the "regulatory power" of the executive (article 37), and the Conseil Consti-
tutionnel will bar the promulgation of enactments of the legislature that trespass on 
this territory. 
The Conseil d'Etat has proved to be much more important for the protection of 
civil liberties. Since the nineteenth century its principal role has been to protect the 
rights of individuals from invasions by the public administration. In performing this 
function, the Conseil d'Etat has creatively molded a body of "general principles" as 
criteria binding on the public administration. Many of them have been derived from 
the Declaration of the Rights of Man of 1789 and the Preamble to the Constitution, and 
are considered to have constitutional force. See, e.g., B. JEANNEAU, LES PRINCIPES 
GENERAUX DU DROIT DANS LA JURISPRUDENCE ADMINISTRATIVE {Paris: Sirey. 1954); Syndicat 
G~eral des Ingenieurs-Conseils, Conseil d'Etat, Decision of June 26, 1959, DALLoz, 
JURISPRUDENCE 541 (1959). This development has become particularly important since 
1958 when the executive's domain was dramatically increased. The Conseil d'Etat has 
courageously affirmed the extension of its judicial review to the "regulatory power" 
of the executive, thus becoming the most important organ of control of the constitu-
tionality of state action in France. See, e.g., F. BATAILLER, LE CONSEIL D'ETAT JUGE 
CONSTITUTIONNEL 196-219 (Paris: Pichon et Durand-Auzias. 1966). 
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constitutional trend, including Turkey,73 and since 1963 even Yu-
goslavia.74 
The new trend, no doubt, encompasses much more than civil pro-
cedure. Constitutional guarantees, as envisaged by the Italian, the 
German, or the Austrian constitutions, govern not only civil, but to 
an even greater degree, criminal proceedings. Yet, perhaps unexpect-
edly, the impact has been great even in the field of civil litigation. In 
the last few years, from one or another of the European constitutional 
courts we have learned, for instance, that it is a violation of the 
constitutionally guaranteed right to have an independent and statu-
torily predetermined judge when civil jurisdiction is entrusted to a 
court whose members are at the same time functionaries of the active 
administration.75 We have also learned that the plaintiff's constitu-
73. Turkish Constitution of 1961, arts. 145-52. See, e.g., Bekir Balta, Die Verfassungs• 
gerichtsbarkeit in der Turkei, in MAx-PLANCK-INsTITUT, supra note 69, at 550-67. 
74. Yugoslavian Constitution of 1963, arts. 241-51. See, e.g., W. GELLHORN, OMBUDS· 
MEN AND OTHERS 273-78 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 1966); Djordjevic, Les 
Cours constitutionnelles en Yougoslavie, 14 (No. 4) LE NOUVEAU DROIT YoucoSLAVE 9 
(1963). 
On the spread of judicial review to other countries see M. CAPPELLE1TI, supra note 
68, at ch. 3, § 2. 
75. German Constitutional Court, Decision of November 17, 1959, No. 15, 10 
ENTSCHEIDUNCEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNCSGERICHTS 200. As a result of this very important 
decision, more than 1,400 small courts (Friedensgerichte) were abolished in the Land 
Baden-Wiirttemberg. One of the principal reasons for the decision was the fact that the 
local mayors acted as judges in these courts. A second judgment has clarified and 
somewhat attenuated the prior decision, due more to a recognition of a deeply rooted, 
centuries-old tradition of the Land Baden-Wiirttemberg than to any weakening of the 
constitutional principle of strict separation of powers. Decision of May 9, 1962, No. 11, 
14 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNCSCERICHTS 56, 75-76. 
The principle stated in the text undoubtedly holds true for Italy, whether the courts 
involved are civil, criminal, or administrative. See, e.g., Italian Constitutional Court, 
Decision of June 3, 1966, No. 55, 11 GIURJSPRUDENZA COSTlTUZIONALE 879 (1966) (uncon-
stitutionality of the Prefectural Councils because the members of these courts were at 
the same time members of the public administration; these courts had adjudicatory 
powers concerning the financial liability of local government employees); Decision of 
March 22, 1967, No. 30, 90 FoRo ITALIANO I, 681 (1967) (unconstitutionality, for the 
same reasons, of the judicial functions of the Giunte Provinciali Amministrative which 
heard claims against local administrative entities); Decision of Dec. 22, 1962, No. 108, 
115 G1URJSPRUDENZA ITALIANA I:I, 305 (1963) (unconstitutionality of the special agricul-
tural divisions of the ordinary civil courts of general jurisdiction; the majority of the 
judges were lay "experts" who lacked full independence since they were, in effect, chosen 
by their professional associations which could also require their substitution at any 
time). For a statement of an even stronger doctrine, see Italian Constitutional Court, 
Decision of Dec. 22, 1961, No. 70, 6 GIURJSPRUDENZA COSTlTUZIONALE 1282 (1961). In this 
case, the Court declared a statute unconstitutional because in certain lease litigations it 
bound the ordinary civil courts to a technical determination of facts by an administra• 
tive body. The statute left to the judge review of violations of law, contradictions, and 
patent errors of opinion in the administrative determination, and entitled the judge to 
request clarification or to order an entirely new determination, but only by the same 
administrative body. However, in the words of the Constitutional Court, "the challenged 
provisions take away from the judge the power to freely evaluate the principal issue 
of the controversy; in this way, the decision of the case is in substance taken from the 
ordinary judge and placed in the hands of an administrative organ." Id. at 1289. 
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tional "right of action" is violated by requiring him, at the discretion 
of the judge, to post a security bond as a prerequisite to the com-
mencement or prosecution of an action.76 We have learned that even 
in civil cases a right to counsel and a system of legal aid may be 
necessary elements of the constitutionally guaranteed right to a fair 
hearing,77 and that even in civil cases unconstitutionally obtained 
evidence may be excluded.78 Inadequate notice, as well as unreason-
able limitations of the parties' right to present or to refute evidence, 
have also been held to constitute violations of constitutional guar-
76. See Italian Constitutional Court, Decision of Nov. 29, 1960, No. 67, 5 G1tJRIS· 
PRUDENZA cosnroZIONALE 1195 (1960) (the Court found that the prerequisite could have 
the effect of denying access to court, i.e., right of action, to those who, although not 
eligible for legal aid, had insufficient means to post the bond). 
In Germany, the Bundesuerfassungsgericht considered a similar issue. Decision of 
Jan. 12, 1960, No. 22, 10 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS 264. The 
Court held the challenged statute constitutional, but stated that, if through these 
provisions "recourse to the courts is made unreasonably exacting or difficult," it would 
be no longer consistent with the Constitution. Id. at 268. 
77. See German Constitutional Court, Decision of June 18, 1957, No. 6, 7 ENT-
SCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS 53 (denial of legal aid in a proceeding 
concerning the legitimacy of a child found to violate the right to be heard guaranteed 
by art. 103 of the Constitution; the fact that in such proceedings the judge has exten-
sive powers of initiative does not make a request for legal aid capricious). See Italian 
Constitution, art. 24, para. 2 (right to counsel) and para. 3 (legal aid: "Poor persons 
must, by appropriate institutions, be assured the means to plead and to defend them-
selves before any judicial body'?• 
An analogous doctrine has been affirmed under the European Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. See European Commission 
of Human Rights, Application No. 2804/66 (Struppat v. The Federal Republic of 
Germany), July 16, 1968, 27 CoLI.ECTION OF DECISIONS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION OF 
HUMAN RIGHTS 61. Note that some of the member states attribute to the Convention 
constitutional or even supraconstitutional force. See note 89 infra. 
78. In Germany, the Supreme Federal Court for civil and criminal matters (Bundes-
gerichtshof) has excluded, both in civil and criminal cases, the use of evidence obtained 
in violation of the constitutionally guaranteed right to privacy. Moreover, this doctrine 
has been affirmed iuespective of whether the evidence was obtained privately or by 
public officials. See Bundesgerichtshof, Civil Division, Decision of May 20, 1958, 11 
NEUE JURISTISCHE WoCHENSCHRIFT 1344 (1958) (secret tape recording by a private person 
of a conversation excluded in a civil case); Bundesgerichtshof, Criminal Division, 
Decision of Feb. 21, 1964, 17 NEUE JURISI'ISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT 1139 (1964) (use of 
private diaries by the public prosecutor without the consent of their author excluded 
in a criminal case, whether they came into the possession of the prosecutor through a 
state or a private act). 
In Italy, the Constitutional Court has recently affirmed that judges cannot base their 
decisions on "evidence forbidden by law." Although occasioned by a criininal case, the 
statement is formulated as a general principle of law, applicable in any proceeding. 
Constitutional Court, Decision of Dec. 2, 1970, No. 175, 95 FoRo ITALIANO I, 2985 
(1970). 
See also European Commission of Human Rights, Application No. 2645/65 (Scheich-
elbauer v. Austria), Oct. 3, 1969, 30 COLI.ECTION OF DECISIONS OF THE EUROPEAN COM• 
MISSION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 1 (admission by an Austrian court of illegally obtained 
evidence found possibly to violate the "right to a fair hearing" guaranteed by art. 6, 
para. 1, of the Convention; although stated in the context of a criminal case, the 
language used by the Commission seems of general applicability since art. 6, para. I 
applies equally to civil cases). 
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antees.79 More generally, civil as well as criminal courts have been 
constitutionally required not to base their decisions on facts, evi-
dence, or procedural acts on which the parties have had no adequate 
opportunity to be heard.80 
The analogies to, and divergencies from, developments in 
American constitutional jurisprudence are readily apparent. On the 
one hand, the European courts have been in the process of articulat-
ing minimum standards of due process similar, in part, to those de-
veloped by the United States Supreme Court. On the other hand, it 
seems important to observe that, particularly in the field of civil lit-
igation, the constitutional decisions in Europe in some respects have 
gone even farther than those in the United States.81 For instance, the 
79. "Notice is a necessary instrument of a fair bearing." Italian Constitutional 
Court, Decision of June 6, 1965, No. 57, 10 GIURISPRUDENZA COSTITUZIONALE 717, 723 
(1965). Although this decision was occasioned by a criminal case, the language used by 
the Court is clearly general, and applies to any type of judicial proceeding. For Germany 
see, e.g., Constitutional Court, Decision of Feb. 1, 1967, No. 17, 21 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES 
BuNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS 132 (failure to notify the father about a legitimacy pro• 
ceeding held to violate his right to be heard). 
On the parties' right to present or refute evidence see Italian Constitutional Court, 
Decision of Dec. 22, 1961, No. 70, 6 GIURISPRUDENZA COSTITUZIONALE 1282 (1961). This 
decision, discussed in note 75 supra, was also based on the consideration that the 
binding fact determination by the administrative body deprived the parties of their 
constitutional right to present and to refute evidence. Also see Italian Constitutional 
Court, Decision of June 3, 1966, No. 53, 11 GIURISPRUDENZA COSTITUZIONALE 858 (1966). 
In this case, a statute giving the state railroad discretionary power to withhold from 
the court, whether civil or criminal, factual findings of investigations made after rail• 
road accidents was held to violate the parties' right to be heard. "In fact, if the right 
of the parties to present to the judge favorable facts is denied or limited, if the right 
to exhibit evidence concerning those facts is denied or limited, it is then the judicial 
protection itself which is denied or limited." Id. at 870. For Germany, see Constitu• 
tional Court, Decision of Jan. 15, 1969, No. 14, 25 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFAS• 
sUNGSGERICHTS 137 (total judicial disregard of a party's motion to introduce testimonial 
evidence in a case for recovery of a broker's commission violates his right to be heard). 
At the European Convention level, see European Commission of Human Rights, 
Application No. 852/60 (X v. The Federal Republic of Germany), Sept. 19, 1961, in 
1961 YEARBOOK OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 346, 354 (" ••• in 
certain types of cases or in certain circumstances, the refusal by a court to allow the 
witness or witnesses called by the plaintiff to testify, could involve a violation of art. 6, 
para. I, which recognizes the right of everyone to a fair hearing by an impartial 
tribunal that will determine his civil rights and obligations.') (dictum). 
80. See, e.g., German Constitutional Court, Decision of July 24, 1963, No. 5, 17 
ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS 86 (failure to give the party an oppor-
tunity to contest expert testimony held to violate his right to be heard). "We have 
consistently affirmed that art. 103, para. 1, of the Constitution does not allow a judicial 
decision to be based on facts or evidence on which the parties have not had an 
opportunity to be heard." Id. at 95. For Italy see Constitutional Court, Decision of 
Dec. 22, 1961, No. 70, 6 G!URISPRUDENZA COSTITUZ!ONALE 1282 (1961). 
81. Consider, for instance, that in the United States the right to appointed counsel 
and legal aid is not yet regarded as a constitutional requirement in civil cases and the 
same is true for the exclusion of illegally obtained evidence. However, there has been 
some discernible movement toward extending these constitutional requirements to 
civil litigation. See, e.g., Note, The Right to Counsel in Civil Litigation, 66 COLUM, L. 
R.Ev. 1322 (1966) (arguing that the right of an indigent civil litigant to appointed coun• 
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European developments would very probably make it impossible, at 
least in some continental nations, to employ methods such as those 
suggested by authoritative sources in this country to reduce the back-
log of the courts "by blocking off some of the roads to the court-
house, "82-particularly by excluding small claims and traffic injury 
cases from the courts. 83 In the European view, these methods would 
violate the constitutional "right of action,"-the right of everyone 
to have all of his substantive rights and legitimate interests protected 
by "predetermined," "impartial," "judicial" bodies, that is, the 
courts.84 Hence, if it is true that the excessive judicial load can be 
sel is constitutionally required by both the equal protection and due process clauses); 
Note, The lndigent's Right to Counsel in Civil Cases, 76 YALE L.J. 545 (1967); State v. 
Union Asphalt &: Roadoils, Inc., 281 F. Supp. 391, 406-10 (S.D. Iowa 1968) (illegally 
seized evidence excluded in antitrust suit for civil damages); Carlisle v. State ex rel. 
Trammell, 276 Ala. 436, 163 S.2d 596 (1964) (illegally obtained evidence excluded in 
civil action for abatement of gambling): Carson v. State ex rel. Price, 221 Ga. 299, 303, 
144 S.E.2d 384, 386 (1965) (gambling abatement; "That this mandate [of exclusion] was 
not for criminal cases only is clear from the Mapp decision and from the more recent 
pronouncement in One 1958 Plymouth Sedan .•.. ") Lebel v. Swincicki, 354 Mich. 427, 93 
N.W.2d 281 (1958) (results of blood test taken while defendant was unconscious excluded 
in a civil case involving two private parties on the basis of state constitutional provision 
similar to fourth amendment): Dixson v. New York, 54 Misc. 2d 100, 281 N.Y.S.2d 912 
(Ct. Cl. 1967) (evidence illegally obtained by state officials excluded in civil litigation); 
Williams v. Williams, 8 Ohio Misc. 156, 221 N.E.2d 622 (1966) (exclusion of evidence in 
divorce proceedings). 
The United States Supreme Court has, itself, only gone so far as to exclude illegally 
obtained evidence in what may be termed "quasi-criminal" proceedings. See One 1958 
Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693 (1965) (forfeiture proceeding). However, 
some strong dissenting opinions have suggested that several members of the Court are 
not happy with the distinction between civil and criminal cases in the application of 
the fourth amendment. See, particularly, the dissents of Justices Douglas (joined by 
Justice Black) and Brennan (joined by Justices Black and Douglas and Chief Justice 
Warren) in Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217, 241, 248 (1960) and Justice Douglas 
(joined by Justices Black and Brennan) in Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 374-76 (1959). 
The language expressing this view is especially strong: "The Court now casts a shadow 
over that guarantee as respects searches and seizures in civil cases. Any such conclusion 
would require considerable editing and revision of the Fourth Amendment •••• The 
protection of the Fourth Amendment has heretofore been thought to protect privacy 
when civil litigation, as well as criminal prosecutions was in the offing ..•. The Court 
misreads history when it relates the Fourth Amendment primarily to searches for 
evidence to be used in criminal prosecutions." Frank was effectively overruled in 
Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967). The Court condemned warrantless 
searches by health officials as violative of the fourth amendment, thus making it appear 
likely that the exclusionary rule will be applied to such administrative searches in the 
future. 
82. Rosenberg, Frank Talk on Improving the Administration of Justice, 47 TEXAS 
L. R.Ev. 1029, 1034 (1969). 
83. See, e.g., Rosenberg, supra note 82, at 1034-35; Wright, Procedural Reform: Its 
Limitations and Its Future, l GEORGIA L. REV. 563, 568-69 (1967). 
Of course, changes in the substantive law and insurance plans that would make 
recourse to court less necessary and frequent would be unaffected by the developments 
mentioned in the text. 
84. See Italian Constitution, arts. 24, para. I ("Everyone has a right of access to the 
courts for the protection of his rights and legitimate interests") and 25, para. 1 (:'No 
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reduced only by transferring a portion of it to nonjudicial agencies 
or by dividing it among a larger number of judges, the current 
European solution would bluntly reject the first alternative, no 
matter how many hundreds or thousands of new judges would have 
to be provided. 85 
one shall be denied the right to have his case decided by his natural, statutorily pre-
determined judge"). In addition, art. II3 specifically extends the individual's right to 
have judicial protection to cases involving administrative action. All these provisions 
of the Constitution have been liberally applied by the Constitutional Court in a number 
of decisions which have declared several statutes unconstitutional because they limited 
or denied this "right of action." See, e.g., L. CoMOGUO, LA GARANZIA COSTITUZIONALE 
DELL'AZIONE ED IL PROCESSO CMLE (Padova: Cedam. 1969). One momentous case was 
Constitutional Court, Decision of March 31, 1961, No. 21, 6 GIURJSPRUDENZA cosrITU-
ZIONALE 138 (1961). In that case the Court struck down a traditional institution of tax 
law, the "solve et repete," which obliged the taxpayer to pay the amount assessed by the 
taxing agencies before being allowed to challenge the assessment in court. 
As for Germany, there is no explicit general provision in the Constitution concerning 
a "right of action", but art. 19, para. 4 guarantees recourse to the courts for all viola-
tions of individual rights and legitimate interests through any activity of public 
authorities. On the broad interpretation of art. 19, para. 4, given by both the German 
courts and the legal scholars, see, e.g., H. PETERS, GESCHICHTUCHE ENTWICKLUNG UND 
GRUNDFRAGEN DER VERFASSUNG 277-78 (Berlin: Springer. 1969). Moreover, a general "right 
of action" in civil and criminal matters is considered to be a consequence of the 
provisions of arts. 20 para. 2, 92, 97, 101 para. 1, and 103 para. I, of the Constitution. 
See, e.g., A. BAUMBACH, w. LAUTERBACH 8: J. ALBERS, ZIVILPROZESSORDNUNG 1821 (Miin-
chen: Beck. 30th ed. 1970) ("In view of Art. 92 of the Constitution it is no longer 
permissible to transfer civil matters from the courts to administrative organs'): R. 
ZOLLER, ZIVILPROZESSORDNUNG 1047 (Miinchen: Stutz. 10th ed. 1968) (with reference to 
court decisions); Fechner, Kostenrisiko und Rechtswegsperre-Steht der Rechtsweg 
ofjen?, 1969 JURISTENZEITUNG 349; German Constitutional Court, Decision of June 6, 
1967, No. 6, 22 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS 49, 77-81. This does 
not mean that it would be unconstitutional to precondition recourse to the court on a 
prior administrative proceeding, provided that such recourse includes a full re-examina-
tion, both of fact and law. See, e.g., German Constitutional Court, Decision of Nov. 10, 
1964, No. 27, 18 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS 203, 212 ("The right of 
access to court guaranteed by Art. 19, para. 4, of the Constitution, must provide for a 
complete re-examination by a court of the challenged action of the public authority, 
with respect both to fact and law'); Decision of Feb. 5, 1963, No. 24, 15 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN 
DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICH'J'S 275, 282; A. BAUMBACH, W. LAUTERBACH 8: J • .ALnERS, 
supra, at 1821; R. ZOLLER, supra, at 1047. 
The reader should be made aware of the forceful historical background of such a 
jealous concern in the Italian and German Constitutions for safeguarding access to the 
courts. Under the fascist dictatorships, it was not unusual to exempt administrative 
action from judicial review and thereby arbitrarily to deprive individuals of their rights 
through the denial of a judicial remedy. A poignant example can be found in the field 
of the infamous racial legislation; judicial review was abolished for governmental 
action against the Jews. See 2 P. CALAMANDREI, !STITUZIONI DI DIRITTO PROCESSUALE CIVILE 
78-79 (Padova: Cedam. 1943) republished in 4 P. CALAMANDREI, OPERE GIURIDJCHE 310-11 
(M. Cappelletti ed. Napoli: Morano. 1970). For analogous developments in Nazi-
Germany see, e.g., E. KERN, supra note 18, at 151, 199, 202; Fechner, supra at 349. 
Even in France, in the absence of a similar historical background, the Conseil d'Etat 
has established that judicial review of administrative action involving exces de pouvoir 
is a general principle of constitutional force. See Ministre de !'Agriculture v. Dame 
Lamotte, Conseil d'Etat, Decision of Feb. 17, 1950, in M. LONG, P. WEIL 8: G. BRAIBANT, 
LEs GRANDS ARRtrs DE LA JURISPRUDENCE ADMINisrRATJVE 325 (Paris: Sirey. 4th ed. 1965); 
Falco 8: Vidaillac, Conseil d'Etat, Decision of April 17, 1953, in id. at 388. 
85. Indeed, there were 8,935 professional judges active in the ordinary courts in 
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Even more important, perhaps, is the impact of these new con-
stitutional developments on the psychology of the continental judge 
and of European society _at large. Although German and Italian 
judges are not entitled to set aside unconstitutional statutes---the 
power to annul such statutes being reserved to the respective consti-
tutional courts---they do have the power and the duty to suspend a 
civil or criminal case and to submit the decision on the constitutional 
issue to the constitutional court.86 Thus, a new "constitutional 
conscience" is growing among a rather bureaucratic "career judici-
ary" which for centuries has been only too subservient, if not always 
to the executive, certainly to codes and other written legislation. This 
is a radical and, on the whole, quite welcome change, the far-reaching 
consequences of which I leave to your consideration. 
Second, let us consider the "community" and, more generally, 
the "international" problem. A large part of Europe is slowly moving 
Germany on January 1, 1961, whereas there were 10,299 on January 1, 1969; they 
comprise about 80% of the whole professional judiciary (a total of 12,798 on January 1, 
1969, see STATISTISCHES JAHRBUCH FUR DIE BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND 1969, at 100 
(Stuttgart: Kohlhammer. 1969)). In Italy, there were 5,271 professional judges on 
February 15, 1964, and 6,403 on January 29, 1970. In Austria, there were 1,308 in 1962 
and 1,537 in 1968. See Baur, supra note 38, at 449 and n.21 (Germany and Austria); 
CONSIGLIO SUPER!ORE DELLA. MAGISTR.ATURA, RE.Al.TA SOCI.ALE E AMMINISTR.AZIONE DELLA 
GIUSTIZIA-R.Er.Az!ONE ANNUALE SULLO STATO DELLA GIUSTIZIA 105-07 (Roma. 1970) (Italy). See 
also Dinslage, Das Richteramt in der Krise, in DIE UNABHANGIGKEIT DES RICHTERS 27-28 
(Koln: Grote. 1969). It may be interesting to consider that in New York City, which has 
a population of about eight million, slightly above that of Austria, there are only 367 
professional judges, and that increases such as those of sixty-three new federal judge-
ships in 1961, thirty-five in 1966, and sixteen in 1968, have been considered dramatic 
and unprecedented in the United States. See D. K.ARu:N, JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION: THE 
AMERICAN ExPERIENCE 32 (London: Butterworths. 1970); Fleming, Court Survival in the 
Litigation Explosion, 54 JUDICATURE 109 (1970); Olney, An Analysis of Docket Con• 
gestion in the United States District Courts in the Light of the Enactment of the 
Omnibus Judgeship Bill, 29 F.R.D. 217, 218 (1961). 
Other devices that have been used here and there in the United States in order to 
reduce delay would also be considered unconstitutional if employed in Europe. For 
example, certain "deflecting" or "channeling" procedures designed to divert cases from 
busier courts to less congested ones, usually of lower jurisdictional limits, would violate 
the constitutional guarantee of a legally predetermined judge ("lawful" or "natural" 
judge: German Constitution, art. 101, para. l; Italian Constitution, art. 25, para. l; 
Austrian Constitution, art. 83, para. 2). One extreme version of this device is the New 
York "never-never" calendar where cases are placed on a low priority list and are never 
heard until the attorneys agree to litigate in a court of lower jurisdiction. See, e.g., H. 
ZEISEL, H. K.ALVEN, &: B. BUCHHOLZ, DELAY IN THE COURT 209-11 (Boston: Little, Brown. 
1959); Rosenberg, Court Congestion: Status, Causes, and Proposed Remedies, in THE 
COURTS, THE PUBLIC, AND THE LAW EXPLOSION 29, 42-43 (H. Jones ed. Englewood Cliffs, 
N.J.: Prentice-Hall. 1965). Also, the Pennsylvania system of compulsory arbitration of 
small claims with review in the courts being preconditioned on the payment of a fee 
which is nonrefundable even if the appellant is victorious in court would certainly 
violate the constitutional right of action as conceived in Europe. For a description of 
this Pennsylvania institution see H. ZEisEL, H. K.ALVEN &: B. BUCHHOLZ, supra, at 214-15; 
Rosenberg, supra, at 51-53. · 
86. See M. CA!'PELLETTI, supra note 68, at ch. 4. 
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from a conception of absolute state sovereignties to a new dimension 
that is more community and internationally oriented. As in the 
constitutional field, so in this field the "American challenge" is 
strongly at work. Indeed, the "Europe of the nations," divided and 
disorganized both economically and politically, increasingly feels the 
challenge represented by modern federalism as exemplified by the 
United States and, for that matter, by the Soviet Union. These are 
mass psychological feelings, the future impact of which can hardly 
be foreseen. We are still quite far, of course, from some kind of 
European federation; yet the elements of a more integrated Europe 
are growing, even in the field of civil procedure. Evidence of such 
integration can be found in the recent convention for the recogni-
tion and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters, 
concluded under the auspices of the European Economic Commu-
nity by the six member states in Brussels in 1968, as well as the 
draft-convention governing bankruptcy, arrangements, and similar 
proceedings.87 Even more important is the close relationship estab-
lished between the national courts and the Court of Justice of the 
European Communities. When faced with questions of interpreta-
tion or validity of Community Law, the national courts may, or if 
they are courts of last resort must, refer the issue to the Community 
Court for a binding decision.88 Also significant is article 6 of the 
87. Americans have been critical of the E.E.C. Convention on recognition and 
enforcement of judgments. See, e.g., Nadelmann, Jurisdictionally Improper Fora in 
Treaties on Recognition of Judgments: The Common Market Draft, 67 CoLUM. L. REv. 
995 (1967); Nadelmann, The Common Market Judgments Convention and a Hague 
Conference Recommendation: What Steps Next?, 82 HARV. L. REv. 1282 (1969); Hay, 
The Common Market Preliminary Draft Convention on the Recognition and Enforce-
ment of Judgments-Some Considerations of Policy and Interpretation, 16 AM. J. 
COMP. L. 149 (1968); Hamburger, Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments, 
18 AM. J. COMP. L. 367, 390-94 (1970). For a sound summary see R. SCHLESINGER, CoM-
PARATIVE LAW 294 (Mineola, N.Y.: The Foundation Press. 3d ed. 1970). We are ready to 
admit that the Convention is a rather parochial document insofar as nations other 
than the six member states are concerned. However, there is no doubt that, within the 
Community, the E.E.C. Convention represents an important step away from the "Europe 
of the Nations," particularly insofar as it foregoes the future use of improper bases of 
jurisdiction as against defendants domiciled within the Common Market area. 
For the Draft Convention on bankruptcy see, e.g., Hirsch, Vers l'universalite de la 
faillite au sein du Marche commun?, 6 CAHIERS DE DROIT EUROPEEN 50 (1970); Nadelmann, 
L'avant-projet de convention du marche commun sur la faillite: les biens sitw!s a 
l'etranger et les problemes qu'ils posent, 6 RIVISTA DI DIRITTO INTERNAZI0NALE PRIVATO E 
PROCESSUALE 501 (1970); Noel & Lemontey, Aperfus sur le projet de convention euro• 
peenne relative a la faillite, aux concordats et aux procedures analogues, 4 REVUE 
TRIMESTRIELLE DE DROIT EUROPEEN 703 (1968). 
88. Article 177 of the European Economic Community Treaty; art. 150 of the 
Euratom Treaty; art. 41 of the European Coal and Steel Community. See, e.g., A. GREEN, 
POLITICAL INTEGRATION BY JURISPRUDENCE 167-97 (Leyden: Sijthoff. 1969); P. HAY, 
FEDERALISM AND SUPRANATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 120-51 (Urbana: University of Illinois 
Press. 1966); E. STEIN & P. HAY, LAw AND INSTITUTIONS IN THE ATLANTIC AREA 180-99 
(Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill. 1967). 
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European Convention of Human Rights-and here we already 
move into the sphere of the Europe of the fifteen nations, not the 
six.89 That article establishes minimum standards of due process for 
domestic criminal and civil proceedings, including a fair and public 
hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial 
court established by law.90 Admittedly, the Court at Strasbourg and 
the other organs of the Convention have been showing to date more 
restraint than boldness in the implementation of this and other 
parts of the Convention.91 Yet, this initial restraint is probably un-
derstandable, particularly in view of the remarkable innovation 
represented by the Convention which permits individuals to bring 
actions before supranational organs against their own state.92 More-
over, the forced withdrawal of the Greece of the colonels from the 
Council of Europe and the Convention suggests that the Conven-
tion already has something meaningful to require of its members 
in the field of civil liberties. 
Let me conclude on this point by saying that, parallel to a slowly 
growing "constitutional conscience," there is also a "community," 
"European," and "international" conscience growing among the 
judges and people on the old "Continent of the nations." There are 
many signs of this development, even beyond bilateral or multi-
89. Apart from the international force, which of course is identical for all member 
states, the force attributed to the Convention by each state within its domestic legal 
order covers a broad spectrum. It ranges from states where the Convention is considered 
superior to the Constitution itself (e.g., Netherlands), to those where it has constitutional 
force (e.g., Austria), to those where it has the force of ordinary law (e.g., Germany, 
Italy), and finally to those where it does not acquire the status of domestic law (e.g., 
United Kingdom). See, e.g., Bucrgenthal, The Domestic Status of the European Con• 
vention on Human Rights: A Second Look, 7 JOURNAL OF THE INTERNAnONAL COM· 
MISSION OF JURISTS 55 (1966). 
90. For some cases of particular interest sec notes 77.79 supra. Also sec Buergcnthal, 
Comparative Study of Certain Due Process Requirements of the European Human 
Rights Convention, 16 BUFFALO L. REv. 18 (1966); Grementieri, La convention euro• 
pdenne des droits de l'homme et le proces civil, 5 REvuE TRIMESTRIELLE DE DROrr EURO• 
PEEN 463 (1969); Rasenack, "Civil Rights and Obligations" or "Droits et Obligations de 
Caractere Civil": Two Crucial Legal Determinations in Art. 6 (I) of the European Con• 
vention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 3 HUMAN 
RIGHTS J. 51 (1970), 
91. A recent indictment was made by F. Newman, The Convention and Worldwide 
Human Rights: Some Iconoclastic Inquiries, Communication to the !Id International 
Colloquy About the European Convention on Human Rights, Oct. 3, 1970 (publication 
pending). 
A typical recent example is the "Delcourt" Case, Judgment of the European Court 
of Human Rights, D 34.773, Jan. 17, 1970 (participation of public prosecutor in the 
deliberation in chambers of the Belgian Court of Cassation without any opportunity 
for the accused to be represented at this discussion held unanimously not to violate 
art. 6 of the Convention). 
92, It is unfortunate that Italy, as well as Cyprus, Malta, and Turkey, have not yet 
accepted the clause of the Convention giving standing to individuals. 
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lateral treaties and even in France, which still too often seems to feel 
the attraction of an outmoded vision of national grandeur. Indeed, 
it was in France, in 1964-when General de Gaulle was still at his 
apex of power-that a spontaneous judicial development occurred in 
the Munzer case in which the Gour de cassation practically wiped out 
the traditional power of the French judges to review the merits of a 
foreign judgment before giving it recognition.93 My learned friend, 
Kurt Nadelmann, greeted this decision with an article subtitled: 
"One Down, and More To Go"94-and there is more to go, of 
course. Yet, even in this field, the trend is clear. Since it corresponds 
to one of the deepest needs and intellectual attitudes of our time-
international openness-I believe that this trend, too, once finally 
unchained, will go very far indeed, possibly within a relatively short 
time. 
I turn now to the third and last of the newly emerged problems: 
the "social" problem of equal access to justice. No social theory of 
justice could prevail, of course, on the eve of the French and Euro-
pean Revolution, under the dominance of physiocratic theories 
nurtured in the hothouse of Louis XV's Court. A first major step 
was effected, as we saw,95 by the Revolutionary abolition of the 
privileged jurisdictions and the proclamation of the idea of free 
administration of justice. Thus, the Revolution eradicated a cen-
turies old custom of having the judges paid by the parties; it did 
not eliminate, however, all the other expenses of justice, such as 
lawyers' fees and court costs.96 Once more, the bourgeois egalite 
proved to be a very important, but only partial step. All citizens 
93. Munzer v. Munzer-Jacoby, Cour de Cassation, 1st Civil Division, Jan. 7, 1964, in 
1964 SEMAINE JURIDIQUE II 13590 (with comment by Ancel), 1964 (1st sem.) GAZETIE 
DU PALAIS·JURISPRUDENCE 372, 1964 R.EvuE CRITIQUE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVE 344 
(with comment by Batiffol). 
We should mention another important development which again evidences a grow-
ing respect for foreign legal values by the domestic courts of Europe. A line of deci• 
sions of the Italian Court of Cassation, initiated in 1959, struck down the traditional 
conception of foreign law as a mere fact, and affirmed the equal treatment in civil 
proceedings of national law and of foreign law made applicable by conflict-of-law 
rules. See Finaly v. Bonnin, Corte di Cassagione, 2d Civil Division, Judgment of Feb. 
16, 1966, No. 486, in 118 GIURISPRUDENZA !TALIANA I:l, 1401 (1966) (with comment by 
Cappelletti), 91 FoRo ITALIANO I, 1549 (1966). For an analysis of the policy implica-
tions of this development, which is one manifestation of a trend present in a growing 
number of countries, see Cappelletti, Mandatory Ex-Officio Application of Foreign 
Law: The Comparative Method as an Answer in Cases where the Foreign Law Can-
not Be Ascertained, 3 COMPARATIVE AND INTL. L. J. OF SOUTHERN AFRICA 49 (1970); 
note 158 infra. 
94. Nadelmann, French Courts Recognize Foreign Money-Judgments: One Down and 
More to Go, 13 AM. J. CoMP. L. 72 (1964). 
95. See notes 22 &: 23 supra and accompanying text. 
96. See, e.g., P. CATALA &: F. TERRE, supra note 22, at 19. 
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achieved formal equality before the law-yet it is clear today that to 
treat the economically and socially disadvantaged on an equal foot-
ing is but another kind of injustice.97 
Very concrete and precise data are available to define the extent 
of this problem, as may be illustrated by an examination of the way 
the laissez-faire century dealt with the problem of civil justice for 
the poor. For example, the French, the Italian, and the German 
solutions go back to the apogee period of laissez-faire: 1851,98 
1865,99 and 1877100 respectively. They strongly resembled one an-
other and, despite some improvement in Germany,101 they are, prac-
tically speaking, still the law. These solutions are essentially based 
on the idea of the so-called "honorific duty" of the legal profession 
to provide free legal aid to the indigent. Poor parties must, of 
course, demonstrate poverty and good cause, but once they have 
done so they are treated on an equal footing with the rich: free 
counsel, free justice-justice for all. 
Yet, it goes without saying that in a free market economy unpaid 
services tend to be poor. Poor services for the poor! Indeed, it is 
an accepted rule in France that the "honorific duty" only applies 
to the stagiaires, the young and inexperienced lawyers;102 the experi-
enced lawyers generously renounce the honor-and prefer to be paid. 
Also, in order to be able to demonstrate poverty and, above all, good 
cause, the poor, the disabled, and the illiterate need legal advice and 
97. See, e.g., P. CALAMANDREI, PROCEDURE AND DEMOCRACY 89-104 (New York: N.Y.U. 
Press 1956). As noted earlier, a first attempt to deal with the problem of effective 
equality of the parties was made in the Austrian Code of 1895. See note 38 supra and 
accompanying text. 
98. See, e.g., P. CATALA &: F. TERRE, supra note 22, at 20-21; P. FROTIER DE LA 
MESSELitJu:, L'ASSISTANCE JUDICIAIRE 41, 42 (Paris: Dalloz. 1941). 
99. See, e.g., Cappelletti, Poverta e giustizia, 94 FoRo ITALIANO V, 42, 46 (1969). 
100. ZMLPROZESSORDNUNG of 1877, §§ 114-27. See, e.g., A. BLOMEYER, ZMLPROZESSRECHT 
740 (Berlin: Springer. 1963); R. SCHOTT, DAS ARMENRECHT DER DEUTSCHEN CIVIL• 
PROZESSORDNUNG 43, 163-66 Gena: Fischer. 1900). 
101. Although the German solution was originally based, like the French and the 
Italian, on the idea of "honorific duty" (nobile officium) of the lawyers, changes have 
been introduced starting as far back as 1919. As a result, German lawyers who handle 
legal aid cases are compensated by a state fund. This compensation, however, is based 
on a special fee schedule which, particularly in disputes involving larger amounts and 
in matrimonial cases, pays much less than the usual fees. It can in no case exceed a 
maximum of 216 DM (less than $60), and is limited to 75 DM {about $20) in matri-
monial and some other status cases. See Bundesgebilhrenordnung fur Rechtsanwiilte 
(BRAGebO) §123 (as amended on October 29, 1969); A. BLOMEYER, supra note 100, at 
743; L. ROSENBERG &: K. SCHWAB, ZIVILPROZESSRECHT 425 (Miinchen: Beck. 10th ed. 1969); 
Heimerich, Das ilberlebte Armenrecht, 1960 DER BETRIEBs-BERATER 1071, 1072. 
102. See J. ABEILLE, UNE CERTAINE REFORME 57-58 (Paris: Pichon &: Durand-Auzias. 
1970); 1 THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL Am AssOCIATION, DIRECTORY OF LEGAL Am AND 
ADVICE FACILITIES AVAILABLE THROUGHOUT THE WORLD, under France B 9 (London-New 
York 1966); R. SCHLESINGER, supra note 87, at 103. 
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help. Even today in Italy, an application for legal aid must be put in 
writing on special stamped paper and submitted to the legal aid com-
mission attached to the "competent" court; and a meritorious claim 
or defense must be demonstrated by a "specific" and "clear" state-
ment not only of the facts, but also of the means of proof available 
and of the legal grounds for relief.103 Thus, in order to be able to ask 
for free legal aid, one needs legal aid. 
Once again, the dry statistical figures speak with a clear voice. In 
1966, a typical year, 449,947 ordinary civil proceedings were initiated 
in Italy in the courts of first instance, of which only 2,587 were legal 
aid cases-about 0.57 per cent.104 What a happy country, where only 
0.57 per cent of the people are poor! Everybody knows that, unfortu-
nately, this is not the case. The naked truth is that the doors of the 
courts of justice are closed and sealed to the poor.105 
The deception, then, becomes clear. Justice is not equal for all. 
This fact may be further evidenced by other data; such as those 
demonstrating the ratio between the amount in litigation and the 
amount of counsel fees and court costs falling upon the parties. In 
1958, Kaplan, von Mehren, and Schaefer indicated that in Germany 
the ratio ran from 4.1 per cent in larger cases, to fifty-four per cent in 
smaller ones.106 Recent research by a noted Spanish proceduralist 
103. See M. CAPPELLETl'I, La giustizia dei poveri, in PROCESSO E IDEOLOGIE 547-56 
(Bologna: II Mulino. 1969) (exploring the snares and delusions in the administration of 
legal aid in Italy). 
104. See ANNUARIO DI STATISTICHE GIUDIZIARIE 1966, at 19, 27 (Roma: Istituto Centrale 
di Statistica. 1968). The latest issue of the ANNUARIO contains the data for 1967; the 
proportion was 0.49%, 
Note, however, that in this field the situation in Italy appears to be much worse 
than that in Germany and France. In France in 1966, out of a total of 441,290 civil 
cases commenced during that year, 28,105 applications for legal aid were granted, about 
6.4% See ANNUAIRE STATISTIQUE DE LA FRANCE 1968, supra note 59, at 129-30. As for 
Germany, a proportion of about 20% was indicated in 1958 by Kaplan, von Mehren &: 
Schaefer, Phases of German Civil Procedure II, 71 HARV. L. REv. 1443, 1469 (1958). The 
same proportion was found for the Land Baden-Wiirttemberg in 1958 by Heimerich, 
supra note IOI, at 1072, and by Koebel, Zivilrichter und Armenrecht, 17 NEUE JURIS• 
TISCHE WocHENSCHRIFr 392 (1964). Based on data from the German Federal Ministry of 
Justice, we have found the following proportions between the number of civil cases 
and the number of parties given legal aid before the Landgerichte for the year 1968: 
Land Hamburg, 23.6%; Land Bremen, 22.8% Nordrhein-Westfalen, 16%; Hessen, 12.3%: 
.Baden-Wiirttemberg, 11.2%; Bayem, 13.2%; Berlin, 18.5%, The proportions are lower 
for cases before the Amtsgerichte: Hamburg, 6.6%: Bremen, 8.6%: Nordrhein-Westfalen, 
6.9%; Hessen, 6.1%: Baden-Wiirttemberg, 6.9%: Bayern, 11,4%, This is certainly due, at 
least in part, to the fact that it is not necessary to be represented by a lawyer before 
these lower courts, and in practice representation of both parties by a lawyer occurs in 
less than 30% of the cases. See Anlage zur Stellungnahme, supra note 47, at 161. 
105. It seems as though little has changed since Ovid wrote: "Curia pauperibus 
clausa est." Ovm, AMORES, lib. III, VIII, 55. 
106. Kaplan, van Mehren &: Schaefer, supra note 104, at 1464. The proportion of 
4,1% was calculated for cases of 1,000,000 DM (about $270,000); that of 54% for ca5e! 
involving 100 DM (about $27). 
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gives the following figures for Spain:107 in a typical big case involv-
ing 24,000,000 pesetas, the incidence of the costs upon the parties 
is about six per cent; in small cases, typically poor people cases, it is 
from fifty to eighty per cent. The sad conclusion of our Spanish col-
league is that, "[i]n the majority of cases, justice is a luxury which is 
not accessible to the proletariat."108 Team research recently con-
ducted in Italy provides even more startling information.109 While in 
large cases the average incidence of costs upon the parties is as low 
as 8.4 per cent, the figures rise to between fifty-one and sixty per 
cent in cases of less than 1,600 dollars; they jump to 170 per cent in 
cases of less than 160 dollars--clearly an unbearable economic bur-
den. Indeed, this very fact is borne out by the official statistics, which 
show a tremendous diminution of small claim litigation in the last 
seventy years. In the courts of the justices of the peace (conciliatori) 
there were nearly two million cases per year at the turn of the cen-
tury; in recent years, the average has plummeted to below 50,000 
per year,11° while the population has nearly doubled.111 To be sure, 
the turn of the century was not a period of great social concern in 
Italy. On the contrary, welfare and other social interventions by the 
state in the economy have greatly increased since then. Why, then, 
this shocking, dangerous, and regrettable diminution of accessibil-
ity of civil justice to the poor? 
The final answer, I believe, may only be given by the economists 
and sociologists. It is my guess that in a society in which the economic 
and social changes during the last quarter of a century have by far 
surpassed changes that had occurred in the course of many genera-
tions, the machinery of civil and commercial justice, if it is not 
radically, revolutionarily modernized and changed, is doomed to 
explode. Defects not only remain; they grow geometrically more 
aggravating. And it is indeed little wonder that those who are sys-
tematically excluded from the official justice are turning to violent 
methods of self-help. 
As you see, our survey of modem trends of reform has brought us 
to another urgent and immense need for change that is typical of our 
epoch-and certainly not in Europe alone. It is the need for greater 
107. See de Miguel, Los costos 'Y las costas en el proceso civil espanol, 1969 REvlsTA 
DE DERECHO PROCESAL IBEROAMERICANA 901, 928-33. 
108. Id. at 933. 
109. See C. CASTELLANO, C. PACE&: G. PALOMBA, L'EFFICIENZA DELLA CIUmZIA ITALIAN.\ 
5!1-86, esp. 64-73 (Bari: Laterza. 1968). 
110. See C. CAST.EI.LANO, C. PACE &: G. PALOMBA, supra note 109, at 82-83. 
111. See s. CLOUGH, THE ECONOMIC HISTORY OF MODERN ITALY 381 (New York: 
Columbia University Press. 1964). 
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social justice. The need is felt-and the trend is apparent. Of course, 
conditions are very different from one area to another; they are worse 
in Spain and Italy than in Germany or France, as they are worse in 
Germany and France than in Sweden. Yet, they were also very bad in 
Sweden only two or three generations ago. The difference is one of 
timing, not of trend. In Italy, for instance, after a stagnation of more 
than one century, a bill for a far-reaching reform of the legal aid 
system is finally under discussion in Parliament,112 as a result, in part, 
of the pressure of constitutional requirements.113 The bill provides 
for a national public fund to compensate the private practitioners 
who assist indigent persons-a form of social "judi-care." Elsewhere 
on the Continent, too, reformist zeal is growing in connection with 
this and other social aspects of civil justice.114 Since 1949, England, 
perhaps more than any other country, has become the model gener-
ally looked to by European reformers in the field of legal aid,ms al-
though Europeans are well aware also of the tremendous strides in 
this field made in contemporary America.116 
V. DEVELOPMENTS IN COMMUNIST EUROPE 
Since extreme social injustice was one of the major factors leading 
to the Russian Revolution of 1917, it seems appropriate to discuss 
briefly those countries of Eastern Europe, which, after the "great 
112. Bill No. 323, submitted to the Senate by the Minister of Justice on Nov. 19, 
1968, still under discussion. For an appraisal see Cappelletti, supra note 99, at 51-59; 
Denti, A proposito di riforma del gratuito patrncinio, 94 FORO ITALIANO V, 132 (1969). 
The bill was approved by the Senate in March 1971, but still needs the approval of 
the Chamber of Deputies. 
113. See note 77 supra. 
114. See, e.g., J • .ABEILLE, supra note 102, at 57-58; P. FROTIER DE LA MESsELltRE, supra 
note 98, at 144, 146; Baur, supra note 38, at 445-51; Baur, Sozialer Ausgleich durch 
Richterspruch, 1957 JURISTENZEITUNG 193-97; de Miguel, supra note 107; Fechner, supra 
note 84, at 352-53; Heimerich, supra note IOI, at 1071-74; Henke, supra note 48, at 158• 
62. The French Minister of Justice recently emphasized the urgent need for reform of 
the legal aid system. See Le Monde, Feb. 17, 1970, at 15, cols. 5-6. 
115. The English legal-aid program was inaugurated by the Legal Aid and Advice 
Act of 1949, 12 &: 13 Geo. 6, c. 51. For American commentary on the success of the 
system see, e.g., Pelletier, English Legal Aid: The Successful Experiment in Judicare, 40 
U. CoLO. L. R.Ev. IO (1967); Utton, The British Legal Aid System, 76 YALE L.J. 371 
(1966). British commentary on the system, however, has frequently been critical. See, 
e.g., A. PATERSON, A Rl:PORT ON LEGAL Am AS A SoCIAL SERVICE 21-26 (London: Cobden 
Trust. 1970); SOClETY OF LABOUR LAWYERS, JUSTICE FOR ALI. (Fabian Research Series 
273. London: Fabian Society. 1968). 
116. Of particular importance has been the rapid growth of neighborhood law 
offices. See Note, Neighborhood Law Offices: The New Wave in Legal Services for the 
Poor, 80 HARV. L. REv. 805 (1967). There has been a great deal of discussion in England 
about the advisability of instituting a similar program of neighborhood law offices. Of 
particular interest are SOCIETY OF LABOUR LAWYERS, supra note 115, at 37-49; Liell, 
Why Not Neighborhood Law Offices?, Ill SoucrroRS' J. 763 (1967). 
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schism" alluded to before, now form the new "legal family" of 
Socialist law. 
To a certain degree, pre-1917 Russia as well as pre-World War II 
Rumania, Bulgaria, Albania, and, to an even greater degree, all of 
the other nations that now form the Marxist-Socialist part of Europe 
were but a part of that major legal family called the Civil Law.117 
Up to the October Revolution in Russia, and to the end of World 
War II in the People's Democracies, our earlier story applies, then, to 
all of these nations. The 1864 Russian Code of Civil Procedure, as 
well as the 1865 Code of Rumania, were strongly influenced by the 
French Code;118 the Hungarian Code of 1911, as well as the later 
codes of Yugoslavia and Poland, were modeled on the German and 
particularly the Austrian codes of the end of the last century.119 In 
Eastern Europe too, then, the story is that of a reaction against the 
jus commune type of procedure, and recourse to "orality," imme-
diacy, concentration, free evaluation of evidence-in other words, a 
move toward more simplicity, spontaneity, rapidity, and efficiency in 
the administration of civil justice. The sparse data available seem to 
confirm, at least for the twentieth century codifications, a certain 
success in achieving these goals.120 
Unfortunately, data concerning pre-revolutionary Russia have 
been out of my reach. In particular, I have no concrete statistical 
proof to confirm my general impression that civil procedure, based 
on the Russian Code of 1864, was far from successful. What we do 
know, however, is demonstrative enough. The centuries old tradi-
tion in Czarist Russia included two significant characteristics. On 
the one hand, there was a sharp differentiation between law, par-
ticularly the ·written law, which was accessible only to a minor 
elite, and custom, which was in force among the bulk of the popula-
II7. See, e.g., R. DAVID &: J. BRIERLEY, MAJOR LEGAL SYSTEMS IN THE WoRLD TODAY 
229-30 (London: Stevens &: Sons. 1968). 
Il8. See 1 V. GsovsKI, SoVIEr CIVIL LAW 856 (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan 
Law School. 1948); Ionasco, Procedure orale et procedure ecrite dans le proces civil en 
Roumanie, in :t.TUDF.S JURIDIQUF.S 105, 108 (:t.ditions de l'Academie de la Republique 
Socialiste de Roumanie 1970). 
II9. See notes 39, 42, and 43 supra and accompanying text. 
120. This success seems to be illustrated by the duration of civil proceedings in 
pre-World War II Czechoslovakia. For instance, in 1936, 74.4% and 44.9% of civil 
proceedings in the lower and the higher courts of first instance respectively were 
terminated within six months. (Statistics provided by the Czechoslovakian Ministry of 
Justice through the courtesy of Dr. V. Steiner). Note that the Austrian Code of 
1895 and the Hungarian Code of 1911 remained in force after 1918 in the two parts 
of the new state of Czechoslovakia which had belonged previously to Austria and 
Hungary. See Weiss, Das tschechoslowakische Zivilprozessrecht, in DER ZIVILPROZESS IN 
DEN EUROPAISCHEN STAATEN UND IHREN KoLONIEN, supra note 39, at 251, 252. 
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tion.121 On the other hand, the official, centralized, feudalized 
machinery of state and justice was totally extraneous-indeed, even 
hostile-to the people, both in the countryside and the towns.122 
Hence, the great explosion, with its profound repercussions even in 
our apparently so technical subject-civil procedure. 
Understandably, the first field of procedural reform was that of 
the courts' personnel. Indeed, transforming the rules of procedure 
would have had little social and ideological significance without a 
change in the judge's social background. Thus, the reformers decided 
to have judges elected popularly and for limited terms, although un-
der the "guidance" of the omnipotent Communist party;123 to pro-
vide for participation of lay- judges in deciding both the facts and the 
law;124 first to abolish, and then to reorganize on a "collective" basis 
the bar (Advokatura); 125 finally-and here again the authoritarian 
character unfortunately prevails over the social aim-to give full 
powers of intervening in, and even initiating, civil cases to the 
mighty bureaux of the Prokuratura126 (which might be translated as 
the Office of the State Attorney). 
Next came reform in the field of procedure proper: abolishing 
the monopoly of the private parties and their counsel in conducting 
121. See R. DAVID AND J. BRIERLEY, supra note 117, at 135-37. 
122. Feodor Dostoevsky incisively described this situation in his first novel, PooR 
FOLK (New York: E. P. Dutton. 1927). After waiting many years in misery for the 
decision of his suit to collect a debt from a merchant, Gorsckov, one of the novel's 
characters, could not survive the excitement of the long delayed victory. 
123. For a short survey covering the various Socialist nations, which have all 
adopted similar principles, see Cieslak, La participation des dtoyens a l'administration 
de la justice dans les pays socialistes, in 27 REcuEILS DE LA Soc1Eri: JEAN BODIN: 
GouvERNES ET GouvERNANTS 45, 90-95 (Bruxelles: Editions de la Librairie Encyclo-
pedique. 1965). For the Soviet Union especially, see JUSTICE AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM IN THE 
USSR 27•29 (R. Conquest ed. London: The Bodley Head. 1968) [hereinafter R. CON• 
QUEST]; Barry &: Berman, The Soviet Legal Profession, 82 HARV. L. REv. I, 20·24 (1968); 
Tchikvadze, Socialist Legality in the U.S.S.R., in LE CONCEPT DE LA LEGALITE DANS LES 
PAYS socIALISTES 203, 233 (Warszawa: Zaklad Narodowy im. Ossolinskich. 1961). 
124. See, e.g., R. CONQUEST, supra note 123, at 29-32; Cieslak, supra note 123, at 45-
100; Tchikvadze, supra note 123, at 234; Timar, The Participation of Lay Judges in 
Civil Proceedings and the Change in the Direction of the National Economy (in Rus• 
sian), in 10 ANNALES UNIVERSITATIS SclENTIARUM BUDAPESTINENSIS DE ROLANDO Eorvos 
NOMINATAE, SEcno lURIDICA: COLLOQUIUM INTERNATIONALE PROCESSUS CIVILIS 259-68 
(Budapest 1969). 
125. See, e.g., R. CONQUEST, supra note 123, at 32-39; Barry &: Berman, supra note 
123, at 8-17; Friedman &: Zile, Soviet Legal Profession: Recent Developments in Law 
and Practice, 1964 WIS. L. REv. 32, 33-39. 
126. See, e.g., arts. 4 (2), 12, 41 of the 1964 Code of Civil Procedure of the Russian 
Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (RSFSR); arts. 14, 29, 44 para. 2 of the 1962 Basic 
Principles of Civil Procedure of the Soviet Union (for the English translations see 
notes 131 and 133, infra); H. BERMAN, JUSTICE IN THE U.S.S.R. 239 (New York: Random 
House. 1963); R. CONQUEST, supra note 123, at 40-46; Wengerek, Die Grundlagen des 
Zivilprozessrechts in Polen, 1968 JUIUSTENZEITUNG 647, 648. 
April 1971] Civil Procedure in Europe 877 
civil litigation;127 establishing firmly the power as well as the duty of 
the judge, in addition to the Prokuratura, to search for the "objective 
truth" behind and beyond the allegations of the parties;128 requiring 
the court to assume the role of "assisting" and "advising" the parties, 
particularly those not represented by counsel;129 finally, placing 
strong emphasis on the "mass education" character of civil proceed• 
ings, which are to be "celebrated" in public, possibly in the factory, 
the kolkhoz, or the dwelling where comrades and neighbors of the 
litigants may be induced to attend.130 
These, then, are the general characteristics of Soviet civil pro-
cedure as they are reflected in the 1923 and 1964 codes for the Rus-
sian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic,131 in the codes of the other 
127. See, e.g., arts. 4 (3), 14, 34 para. 2, 50 para. 2, 195, 292 para. 2, 293 para. 2, 294, 
320, ll40 para. 3, 407 of the 1964 Code of Civil Procedure of the RSFSR; arts. 16, 30, 33 of 
the 1962 Basic Principles of Civil Procedure of the Soviet Union; H. BERMAN, supra note 
126, at 309; Gurvic &: Gherzon, Le "Norme fondamentali" del diritto processuale civile 
dell'U.R.S.S. e delle Repubbliche dell'Unione, 17 RIVISTA TRIMESTRALE DI DIRITI0 E 
P.R0CEDURA CIVILE 1624 (1963); Pecori, Quelques aspects de la nouvelle procedure civile 
de la Rt!publique socialiste federative sovit!tique de Russie, 20 REvuE INTERNATIONALE 
DE DROIT COMPARE 317, 323-33 (1968); Roggemann, Das Sowjetische Zivilverfahrensrecht, 
12 OSTEUROPA·RECHT 229, 252-55 (1966). For the application of these principles in the 
People's Democracies see, e.g., Gwiazdomorski & Cieslak, La preuve judiciaire dans les 
pays socialistes a l't!poque contemporaine, in 19 RECUEII.S DE LA Soc1trt JEAN BoDIN: LA 
PREUVE 49, 7!1-82 (Bruxelles: Librairie Encyclopedique. 1963); Jodlowski, Les principes de 
la procedure civile polonaise, 12 REvuE INTERNATIONALE DE DR0IT COMPARE 369, 376-81 
(1960); N<!vai, The Authority of the Judge in Conducting Proceedingt. Under the 
Hungarian Law of Civil Procedure, in STUDIES IN JURISPRUDENCE FOR THE SIXTH INTER• 
NATIONAL CONGRESS OF COMPARATIVE LAW 79 (Budapest: Publishing House of the 
Hungarian Academy of Sciences. 1962); N<!vai, La procedure civile hongroise apres la 
seconde guerre mondiale, 1968 ANNALES DE LA FACULTE DE DROIT DE LIEGE 137, 148-55 
(La Haye: Nijhoff.); Wengerek, Les changements apportes ci la procedure civile en 
Pologne par le code de procedure civile de 1961, in ETUDES SUR LE DROIT POLONAIS 
ACTUEL 165, 172-76 (Paris-La Haye: Mouton. 1968). 
128. See, e.g., arts. 14 para. l, 50 para. 2, 56 of the 1964 Code of the RSFSR and 
art.,. 16 para. I, 19 of the 1962 Basic Principles; A. TROUSSOV, INTRODUCTION A LA 
THEOR!E DE LA PREUVE JUD!CIAIRE 12-20 (Moscou: Editions en langues <!trangeres. No date); 
Gwiazdomorski &: Cieslak, supra note 127, at 69-73; Kietz, Die Grundprinzipien des 
Zivilprozesses der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, in DAS ZIVILPROZESSRECHT DER 
DEUTSCHEN DEMOKRATISCHEN REPUBLIK 18, 22-33 (H. Nathan ed. Berlin: Veb Deutscher 
Zentralverlag. 1957); Nevai, The Authority, supra note 127, at 86-90; Tchikvadze, supra 
note 123, at 234; Wengerek, supra note 126, at 649. 
129. See, e.g., art. 14 para. 2, of the 1964 Code of the RSFSR; art. 16 para. 2, of the 
1962 Basic Principles; J. HAZARD, SETILING DISPUTES IN SOVIET SOCIETY 403-05, 456-63 
(New York: Columbia University Press. 1960); Kellner, Die miindliche Verhandlung, 
24 NEUE Jusnz 170 (1970). 
130. See, e.g., art. 2 para. 2, of the 1964 Code of the RSFSR; art. 2 para. 2, of the 
1962 Basic Principles; H. BERMAN, supra note 126, at 83, 308-09; DAVID, Les donnees 
fondamentales du droit sovietique, in I R. DAVID &: J. HAZARD, LE DROIT SovIETIQUE 
206·1 l (Paris: Pichon et Durand-Auzias. 1954); Piischel, Zivilprozess und Zivilprozessrecht, 
in DAS ZIVILPROZESSRECHT DER DEUTSCHEN DEMOKRATISCHEN REPUBLIK, supra note 128, 
at 4-6; Tchikvadze, supra note 123, at 235-36. 
llll. The RSFSR, centering around Moscow, is by far the most important and most 
populous of the Soviet Union's Republics. The 1923 Code is translated into English in 
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Soviet Republics,182 as well as in the Union's Basic Principles of Civil 
Procedure of 1962.188 With noteworthy but not overly impressive 
variations, in the past twenty-five years these have also become the 
general characteristics of civil procedure in the other European coun-
tries of the Communist orbit184-although I should immediately add 
that, in many respects, in most of these countries the changes in the 
field of civil procedure have not been quite so revolutionary as in 
Russia. In fact, the Austrian Code, imitated in most of those coun-
tries' pre-war legislation, had already provided that the judge be 
very active in controlling and speeding up litigation and be con-
cerned with his role in "assisting" and "educating" the economically 
and intellectually weaker party. Franz Klein's definition of civil pro-
cedure as a Wohlfahrtseinrichtung, an institution for the collective 
welfare, is well known.135 
About how all of this, old and new, actually works today in 
Eastern Europe, I know too little.136 Of course, the impression of an 
2 V. GsovsKI, SOVIET C1vIL LAw 553-640 (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Law 
School. 1949); the 1964 Code is translated into English in 11 LAW IN EA.STERN EUROPE: 
THE CIVIL CODE AND THE CoDE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE OF THE RSFSR 1964 (A. Kiralfy 
transl. Leyden: Sijthoff. 1966). 
132. As a prominent Soviet proceduralist informs us, the 1964 Code of Civil 
Procedure of the RSFSR was the first to be compiled and has served as the model for 
the codes of the other republics of the Soviet Union. As a result, differences among 
the various codes are minimal. See Gurvic, La nuova legislaz.ione processuale civile 
nell'URSS, 22 RIVISTA TRIMESTRALE DI DIRITIO E PROCEDURA CIVILE 710, 714 (1968). The 
same was true for the Code of 1923. See Gsovski, The Soviet Union, in 1 GOVERNMENT, 
LAw AND COURTS IN THE SOVIET UNION AND EAsTERN EUROPE 1, 15 0/· Gsovski &: 
K. Grzybowski eds. London: Stevens & Sons. 1959). 
133. The 1962 Principles, providing a binding guideline for all the Union Republics, 
is translated into English in 7 LAw IN EAsTERN EUROPE: MISCELLANEA 299-317 (Leyden: 
Sijthoff. 1963). 
134. See, e.g., M. CAPPELLETII, Interrogatorio della parte e principii fondamentali 
del processo civile nell'Europa comunista, in PRoCESSo E IDEOLOGIE, supra note 103, 
at 35-98. 
135. See, e.g., F. KLEIN, ZEIT- UND GEISTESSTROMUNGEN IM PROZESSE, 25, 26, 29 (Frank-
furt a. M: Klostermann. 2d ed. 1958) (a lecture given in 1901); F. KLEIN &: F. ENGEL, 
supra note 36, at 191-95 and passim; Satter, supra note 38, at 272. See generally Baur, 
supra note 38, at 445-53; Malaniuk, Die Stellung des Richters und die Prozessref orm, 
in FES"I5CHRIFT ZUR FiiNFZIGJAHRFEIER, supra note 55, at 175-200. See note 3S supra and 
accompanying text. 
136. Regarding the problem of duration of civil cases, I owe to the courtesy of 
Professors V. Steiner of Prague, H. Kellner of East Berlin, E. Wengerek of Poznan, and 
J. Stalev of Sofia, the following official statistics: 
In Czechoslovakia, in 1968 the average duration for civil proceedings in courts of 
first instance was: 48.8% terminated with a final judgment within three months; 25.4% 
between three and six months; 16.7% between six months and one year, 6.8% between 
one and two years; and 2.3% lasted more than two years. 
In East Germany the figures for 1969 concerning ordinary civil proceedings of first 
instance, excluding summary ex parte proceedings and family law matters, were as 
follows: (1) before the Kreisgerichte, 76.9% of the cases were terminated within three 
months; 14.1% between three and six months; 9% took more than six months; (2) 
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inquisitorial, authoritarian, or, at best, paternalistic system of civil 
litigation, with all its dangers of abuse, is not easily avoided. No 
doubt, true social justice should be an instrument to enhance, not 
to trample on, the individual's liberties. However, I do know enough 
of how the Western systems work in practice. The possibility of jus-
tice being unavailable under a strictly adversarial system of litigation 
has become apparent enough in the Western world137 to make easy 
the prophecy that, without prompt and deep social changes, more 
and more mass social explosions will occur. 
VI. TOWARD A MORE ACTIVE ROLE FOR THE JUDGE 
At least in its conception of a more active role for the judge, the 
radical Communist solution, excessive and illiberal as it has only too 
often proved to be, nevertheless appears to be in the mainstream of 
a great current of legal thought and a powerful trend of pro-
cedural reform, which both have their roots within138 as well as out-
side the Old Continent. We must have the courage to admit this fact 
--and to admit that this is perhaps one of the major converging 
trends between East and West, a trend evident even in the United 
States. 
When in 1906 an "obscure young professor of law at Nebraska" 
delivered an address to the American Bar Association entitled The 
Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice, 
before the Bezirksgerichte, 44,4% were terminated within three months; 11.1 % be-
tween three and six months; 44.5% took more than six months. The figures for the 
preceding five years were about the same. 
In Poland, during the years 1963-1967, the average duration of proceedings of first 
instance before the District Courts (which, according to article 16 of the Polish Code 
of Civil Procedure, have broad general jurisdiction) was between 3.1 and 3.7 months. 
In Bulgaria, in 1969, only 9.5% and 8.3% of the civil proceedings of first instance 
before the People's Courts and the Provincial Courts, respectively, required more than 
three months for completion. The figures for the preceding three years were similar. 
137. This is so not only on the Old Continent. In the words of a noted 
American scholar: "It is doubtless true that the theory of our adversary system is 
attractive in statement ••• , but it seldom fits the facts in modem litigation. If it were 
to operate perfectly, both parties would have the same opportunities and capacities 
for investigation, including the resources to finance them, equal facilities for producing 
all the discoverable materials, equal good or bad fortune with reference to availability 
of witnesses and preservation of evidence, and equal persuasive skill in the presentation 
of evidence and argument. The case is rare where there is even approximate equality 
in these respects. • • ." E. MORGAN, SOME PROBLEMS OF PROOF UNDER THE ANGLO-
AMERICAN SYsrEM: OF LmGA.TION 34 (New York: Columbia University Press. 1956). Also 
see F. JAMES, CIVIL PROCEDURE 7 (Boston: Little, Brown. 1965) ("Anything that the law 
of procedure or the judge's role can do to equalize opportunity and to put a faulty 
presentation on the right track so that disputes are more likely to be settled on their 
merits, will in the long run bolster up rather than destroy the adversary system, and 
will increase the moral force of decisions'). 
138. See note 38 supra and accompanying text (Austria and Germany); note 59 
supra (France). For a comparative survey see Habscheid, note 88 supra. 
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the reaction of his audience was "a huge storm of indignation. In-
deed, the first result of Dean Pound's indictment was that most of 
the morning's business session the next day was given over to speeches 
by various leaders of the bar upholding the existing procedures as 
'the most refined and scientific system ever devised by the wit of man' 
and vilifying Pound's address as an attempt to destroy that which the 
wisdom of the centuries had built up."139 Pound had the audacity to 
attack mercilessly that sanctuary of Anglo-American law which he 
contemptuously called "the sporting theory of justice"140-the accep-
tance "as a matter of course that a judge should be a mere umpire, ... 
and that the parties should fight out their own game in their own way 
without judicial interference";141 he challenged "the idea that 
procedure must of necessity be wholly contentious" and that the 
judge "is merely to decide the contest, as counsel present it, •.. not 
to search independently for truth and justice."142 
What in 1906 could still appear as a scandalous and unjustified 
indictment, however, is today but a broadly accepted truth. As Judge 
Irving R. Kaufman said at a seminar of prominent American judges 
and lawyers in 1961, "our current emphasis on early judicial inter-
vention is ... the culmination of the efforts of many of our greatest 
legal thinkers to induce the judges to ... take an active part in the 
control of litigation .... Contrary to what most of us have accepted 
as gospel, a purely adversarial system, uncontrolled by the judiciary, 
is not an automatic guarantee that justice will be done."148 Of 
course, Americans still have a long way to go in this direction, espe-
cially if it is even partly true, as Judge Kaufman asserted nine years 
ago and the Chief Justice of the United States reiterated as recently 
as August 10, 1970, that in many respects "the similarities are still 
striking" between the situation in 1906 and the present day situa-
tion.144 Yet, many European and other civil-law countries, particu-
139. Kaufman, The Philosophy of Efjective Judicial Supervision over Litigation, 29 
F.R.D. 207, 208-09 (1962). 
140. Pound, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of 
Justice, 8 BAYLOR L. REv. 1, 14, 24-25 (1956) (previously published in 40 AM. L. R. 729 
(1906)). 
141. Id. at 14. 
142. Id. at 14-15. 
143. Kaufman, supra note 139, at 208, 211. 
144. Id. at 210; Burger, The State of the Judiciary-1970, 56 A.B.A.J. 929, 9l!l! (1970). 
Chief Justice Burger states: "If you will read Pound's speech, you will see at once that 
we did not heed his warning, and today, in the final third of this century, we are still 
trying to operate the courts with fundamentally the same basic methods, the same 
procedures and the same machinery he said were not good enough in 1906." Id. at 
929. 
One recent attempted reform in which American proceduralists placed great hope 
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larly in the Latin areas of Europe and America where the Austrian 
model of a socially concerned judicial activism has not yet been im-
plemented, have an even longer way to go in this universal quest 
for effective, accessible, and truly democratic justice. 
To be sure, procedure and procedural techniques are not the 
only tools in this quest. Reforms outside the field of procedure are of 
primary importance. But as long as an adversarial system of litigation 
provides a privileged position for the economically stronger party, 
social reforms limited to substantive law are insufficient. For ex-
ample, socially progressive labor law is well developed in Italy; yet 
labor proceedings, with their unbearable duration, put the economi-
cally weaker party at a disadvantage.145 As in the field of substantive 
law, so in that of procedure the better way to meet the challenge of 
our time is not by sticking to old laissez-/ a ire schemes, but rather by 
trying to reconcile private initiative with an appropriate degree of 
official control. 
The final comment on this problem can be that of Dean Charles 
W. Joiner: "'No one wants to be a radical.' Few lawyers wish to be 
so characterized, yet procedure reform and honest appraisal demand 
radicals. "146 
VII. PROCEDURE AND !DEOLOGIES 
"Prophecies," politics, ideologies: what has all this to do, one 
might ask, with civil procedure? This question leads us to my last 
point. 
Indeed, civil procedure has traditionally been considered a very 
technical branch of the law-the technical branch par excellence; 
and as a mere technique it has usually been studied and taught. Only 
too rarely have its ideological foundations, its philosophical back-
ground, its socio-political impact been analyzed.147 
was the pretrial conference as a means of judicial activism in the conduct of proceed-
ings. These hopes have been, in part, disappointed. See M. ROSENBERG, THE PRETRIAL 
CONFERENCE AND EFFECTIVE JUSTICE 28-70 (New York: Columbia University Press. 
1964). This failure of the pretrial conference is not surprising to a European ob-
server; it was simply the wrong institution. In those European countries where the 
intervention of the judge in the conduct of proceedings has proved to be successful 
(Austria, Sweden, etc.), the fundamental institution for this intervention has been 
conference between the judge and the parties (assisted, but not substituted, by their 
lawyers). See, e.g., R. GINSBURG &: A. BRUZELIUS, CIVIL PROCEDURE IN SWEDEN 244 &: n.115 
(The Hague: Nijhoff. 1965). 
145. See, e.g., Cappelletti, Il processo come fenomeno sociale di massa, 25 IL PONTE 
1234, 1236 (1969). 
146. Joiner, Lawyer Attitudes Toward Law and Procedural Reform, 50 JUDICATURE 
23, 27 (1966). See Wright, supra note 83, at 574. 
147. For an effort in this direction, ace M. CAl'l'.ELLE'ITI, supra note 103. 
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Such an analysis, however, is indispensable once the proceduralist 
becomes aware that no legal technique is an end in itself, none 
is ideologically neutral. Take, for instance, the "formal," numerical 
system of proof. Not only was it a reflection and a crystallization in 
the field of procedure of a hierarchically structured, nonegalitarian 
society-the superiority of the nobleman, the clergyman, the rich, 
over the commoner, the layman, the poor148-but it was also a direct 
reflection and a legal imposition of an a priori, scholastic method 
of thinking. This method based the discovery of facts not on con-
crete observation and empirical case-by-case evaluation of factual 
and evideµtial phenomena, but on abstract premises once and for 
all accepted as "absolutes," from which the "truth" had to be de-
rived in a mechanical way.149 This was the mentality-the Ptolemaic 
method of thinking-of the epoch; it was faithfully mirrored in 
the courts. 
Everybody knows of the great intellectual revolution that, led by 
such pioneer spirits as Galilei, Bacon, and Newton, introduced 
what we now call the modern era in human thinking, charac-
terized by the primacy of observation, of trial and error methodology 
-in sum, the scientific method as opposed to the dogmatic and 
scholastic one. This revolution, too, is reflected in the law of pro-
cedure and evidence. As the beliefs of the man of science are, in the 
words of Bertrand Russell, "tentative, not dogmatic; they are based 
on evidence, not on authority,"150 so are those of the modern judge. 
When Voltaire inveighed against some of the basic rules of the for-
mal system of proof still prevailing in his time, exclaiming that "it 
is for the judges to weigh the value of the testimony" and the wit-
nesses' sincerity, 151 the new common sense was speaking through 
him. And so was the new common sense guiding Napoleon when he 
attacked another of the old basic rules. He found it unacceptable 
that one honest man's testimony could not be received as evidence, 
148. See note 11 supra and accompanying text, 
149. For instance, one "absolute" affirmed by Thomas Aquinas himself was that 
"muller est minoris virtutis et dignitatis quam vir" (women are of lesser virtue and 
dignity than men); hence, the exclusion of women from giving evidence, or their 
lesser weight as witnesses. See 2 G. SALVIOLI, supra note 8, at 430. Other basic rules of 
the numerical system of proof derived their purported absolute character from 
sacred texts. Thus, the rule that excluded the testimony of one single witness and 
the rule that considered two uncontradicted witnesses to be full proof binding on the 
court were based on passages in the Bible. See, e.g., 7 J. WIGMORE, supra note 6, at 
242-43, esp. n.6. 
150. B. RUSSELL, HlsTORY OF WF.STERN PHILOSOPHY 514 (London: Allen 8: Unwin. 
1961). 
151. F. DE VOLTAIRE, Prix de la justice et de l'humanitt! art. 22, § 4, in 29 0.EUVJlES 
COMPLETES 337 (Imprimerie de la Societe litteraire-typographique. 1785). 
April 1971] Civil Procedure in Europe 883 
while that of two rascals ("deux coquins") had to be accepted as full 
proof.1112 Indeed, the formal system of proof was soon to collapse-
in France first, and then elsewhere. Common sense cannot be kept 
out of the courts for too long. 
And so it is with all of the other aspects of procedure. Take, as 
another example, the relationship between the individual and the 
authorities. Secrecy of civil and, even more so, criminal proceedings 
was clearly a manifestation of oppressive authoritarianism. It 
necessarily came under heavy attack during the liberal European 
revolution that swept through the Old Continent from the end 
of the eighteenth century to the middle of the nineteenth. Two 
significant results were the abolition in revolutionary France of 
the secret character of the taking of testimonial evidence and the 
proclamation of publicity and orality of proceedings as fundamental 
rights of man in the principal constitutional documents stemming 
from the uprisings of 1848-1849.153 
So it is also with the relationship of the individual to society. The 
last two or three decades of the nineteenth century witnessed the 
incipient decline, on the one hand, of laissez-faire conceptions in the 
organization of society, and the emergence, on the other hand, of 
new labor organizations as political forces. This development marked 
the commencement of social and welfare legislation in the more 
progressive nations, evidenced, once more, by the Austrian Code of 
1895 with its conception of civil procedure as an educational tool 
and an institution for social welfare,154 an idea which had a deep 
influence on the modern legislation of other countries. Moreover, 
whereas nineteenth century individualism was manifest in the con-
ception of civil procedure as a private affair of the parties-Pri-
vatsache der Parteien155-the movement toward a more active in-
152. See F. G0RPHE, L'Al'PRECIATION DES PREUVES EN JUSTICE 35 (Paris: Sirey. 1947); 
7 J. WIGMORE, supra note 6, at 256 n.3. 
153. On the Revolutionary abolition of the principe du secret de l'enquete, see 
note 24 supra and accompanying text. On orality and publicity of proceedings, both 
criminal and civil, proclaimed in the Declaration of Fundamental Rights by the 
National Assembly at Frankfurt in December 1848 and in the Reichsverfassung of 
March 1849, see, e.g., R. SCHMIDT, I.EHRBUCH DES DEUTSCHEN ZIVILPROZESSRECHTS 104-05 
(Leipzig: Duncker 8e Humblot. 2d ed. 1906). 
In pre-Revolutionary France, the campaign against secrecy of procedure (partic-
ularly in criminal cases) as a manifestation of oppressive authoritarianism was led 
by Voltaire. See J. DAWSON, supra note 21, at 376-77. 
154. See note 135 supra, and accompanying text. 
155. This conception, already affirmed in the French Code de procedure civile of 
1806, was also basic to the Italian Code of 1865 and to the German Code of 1877. See, 
e.g., M. CAPPELLE'lTI 8e J. PERILLO, supra note I, at 41; H. DE l300R, EINZEI.RICHTER UND 
KOLLEGIUM IM ITALIENISCHEN UND DEUTSCHEN ZIVILPROZESS 13, 61 (Gottingen: Schwartz. 
1953); R. Morel, supra note IO, at 7-8, 344-46. For later changes in Germany and France, 
see notes 38 and 59, supra. 
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volvement of the judge in controlling litigation reflects the growing 
pressure for public intervention in private life which is a feature of 
our epoch. Indeed, this renewed clash between the adversarial and 
the inquisitorial approaches to litigation is but one aspect of the 
major challenge of our time: to reconcile private freedom with social 
justice. Of course, it is with the Communist Revolution that these 
developments have been brought to striking proportions. The basic 
ideology of the Revolution proclaims the abolition of private eco-
nomic rights. As Lenin affirmed in 1922: "We acknowledge nothing 
as 'private.' For us everything in the province of economics is in the 
domain of public law and not of private law.''156 Traditionally, how-
ever, the contents of civil litigation had been and, in the Western 
world, still are "in the province of economics" and, more generally, 
of "private law." The sweeping movement to make that province 
"public" in the Communist states, then, is clearly the ideological 
foundation of all those radical-and, in our eyes, probably excessive 
--changes in the field of Socialist civil procedure of which we spoke 
before. The movement also explains further phenomena which can-
not be analyzed here, such as the sharp reduction of the sphere of 
civil procedure proper.157 
And so it is finally with the relationship between the state 
and the international communities of nations. In this area we notice 
a growing international openness in the trend toward more liberal 
recognition of foreign values, both on the legislative and the judicial 
levels. This is reflected in civil procedure as a new spirit in the 
application of foreign law158 and the recognition of foreign judg-
156. THE I.Aw OF THE Sov!Er STATE 76 (A.Y. Vyshinsky ed. New York: Macmillan. 
4th printing 1961). 
157. This reduction is understandable given the transfer of a great portion of 
those private economic relationships that in the West are the most frequent subject 
matter of civil procedure to the sphere of the state economy, in which organs other 
than the ordinary courts have jurisdiction. One aspect of this development is the 
institution of state arbitration bodies to settle economic disputes between organiza-
tions holding cooperative or state property. See, e.g., R. DAVID &: J. BRIERLEY, supra 
note 117, at 187-93; Stalev, L'arbitrage d'Etat en Rt!publique populaire de Bulgarie, 9 
REVUE DE DROIT CONTEMPORAIN 117 (1962-63). 
158. This is true for both Europe and the United States. See Sass, Foreign Law in 
Civil Litigation: A Comparative Survey, 16 AM. J. CoMP. L. 332, 365-71 (1968). "The 
current trend in American jurisprudence is to discard the doctrine that foreign law 
is fact, to have the court rather than the jury decide questions of foreign law, and 
to permit the court to take judicial notice of the content of the law of foreign 
nations. This trend continues notwithstanding the defense of the common law 
methods of pleading and proving foreign law by several highly authoritative com-
mentators." H. SMIT &: A. MILLER, THE INTERNATIONAL JUDICIAL AssISTANCE IN CIVIL 
MATTERS WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE RELATIONS BETWEEN ITALY AND THE UNITED 
STATES 74 (Milan: Giuffre. 1961). See FED. R. CIV. P. 44.I (added Feb. 28, 1966). For 
Europe, see generally the Symposium on DIE ANwENDUNG AUSLANDISCHEN REcHTS IM 
INTERNATIONALEN PRIVATRECHT, esp. at 33 (Berlin-Tiibingen: de Gruyter-Mohr. 1968): 
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ments,1119 and as a changing mood in the international cooperation 
in litigation.160 Here, of course, reform is only beginning. The 
international organizations still are in the initial stage. Their growth, 
however, is in sight. It is bringing about a new international dimen-
sion even in the domestic courts of the member states. 
VIII. THE PRoCEDURALIST's RoLE 
I have given only a few examples of the close connection of civil 
procedure with the intellectual and political apparatus of society, and 
I could go on. But my time has run out, and I wish to conclude. 
My conclusion is addressed to the subject that is the procedural-
ists' vital concern: the "science"-or simply the study-of civil 
procedure. 
Today, it is only too clear that the happy times are past when 
procedural scholars could be content with a purely technical study of 
local practices and rules. By now, we have discovered that, embodied 
in those practices and rules, are the great waves of history: the socio-
economic as well as the intellectual changes, revolutions, and stagna-
tions of history. We have also discovered the remarkable importance 
of comparative studies as an approach to reform. Finally, we have 
discovered-and I quote from Franz Klein-that "the squalid, arid, 
Giuliano, Le traitement du droit t!tranger dans le proces civil dans les systemes 
juridiques continentaux, 14 REVUE INTERNAnONALE DE DROIT COMPARE 5 (1962). For re-
cent court developments in Italy see note 93 supra. 
159. See notes 87, 93, 94 supra and accompanying text; M. CAPPELLE'ITI, EL VALOR DE 
LAS SENTENCIAS y DE LAS NORMAS EXTRANJERAS EN EL PROCESO CIVIL, esp. pt. I (Buenos 
Aires: Ediciones Jurfdicas Europa-America. 1968). 
In this context, the 1966 Hague Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement 
of Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters is also a progressive and 
noteworthy contribution. See, e.g., Hamburger, supra note 87, at 394-96; Nadelmann 
lk von Mehren, The Extraordinary Session of the Hague Conference on Private In-
ternational Law, 60 AM. J. INTL. L. 803-06 (1966). Also significant is the 1958 New York 
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, con-
cluded under the auspices of the United Nations and now ratified by the major 
Continental countries (France, 1959; Germany, 1961; Italy, 1969). The text is reported, 
and followed by comments by P. Sanders and M. Domke, in 2 INTERNATIONAL COM· 
MERCIAL .ARBITRATION 277 (P. Sanders ed. The Hague: Nijhoff. 1960). 
160. For a country-by-country survey of the various forms of assistance rendered 
by one state in connection with judicial proceedings in another, see INTERNATIONAL 
Co-oPERAnON IN LITIGATION: EUROPE (H. Smit ed. The Hague: Nijhoff. 1965). The 
volume also covers recent legislative developments in the United States, including 
FED. R. Civ. P. 4(i) and 28(b) (as amended Jan. 21, 1963). Id. at 409-64. 
In this context, the 1964 Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extra-
judicial Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters, as well as the 1968 Draft Con-
vention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters, should 
also be noted. The two documents are reported in 13 AM. J. COMP. L. 620 (1964) and 
16 AM. J. COMP, L. 594 (1968), respectively. See generally F. PoCAR, L'ASSISTENZA 
GIUDIZIARIA INTERNAZIONALE IN MATEIUA CIVILE (Padova: Cedam. 1967). 
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neglected phenomenon of civil procedure is in fact strictly connected 
with the great intellectual movements of peoples; and that its varied 
manifestations are among the most important documents of man-
kind's culture. "161 
Thus, the proceduralists' task has grown to enormous proportions. 
We once considered ourselves the priests of a neutral science or art. 
Now we have learned that history and political science, economics 
and sociology have become necessary ingredients of our work. We 
also once believed that law and procedure were the net product of 
local and national situations. Now we have learned that an insulated 
study of law and procedure, sealed within local and national 
boundaries, does not correspond to the growing international di-
mension of our epoch. 
The difficulty of such a task fills us with a sense of fear. What, 
then, does our epoch demand of us? 
The answer, however, is as simple as it is clear. We must defi-
nitely reject the traditional deceptions that are not worthy of us, of 
our students, of our readers. Procedure is not pure form. It is the 
meeting point of conflicts, of policies, of ideas. It is the "Cape 
Wrath" where Rapidity and Efficiency have to be combined with 
Justice; it is also the "Cape of Good Hope" where Individual Liberty 
has to be combined with Equality of Opportunities. Procedure is, in 
fact, the faithful mirror of all of the major exigencies, problems, 
and trials of our epoch-of the immense challenge of our time. 
Here, my fellow proceduralists, is our challenge. Here is our 
work. 
161. F. KLEIN, supra note 135, at 8. See also P. CALAMANDREI, supra note 97, at 76 
(" ••• the judicial process reflects the ••• structure of the state, just as a drop of water 
reflects the sky"). 
